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ESSENTIAL INTELLIGENCE
for determining
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE STRATEGY AND TACTICS

to

NORTH AFRICA

A Preliminary Report

Psychology Division

In the African Section

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ESSENTIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR DETERMINING STRATEGY AND TACTICS
OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN NORTH AFRICA

Three kinds of information are requisite:

1. Basic social information essential to the evaluation of the current situation and to the intelligent execution of U.S. psychological warfare in the area.
2. The current pertinent attitudes and actions of the important social groups toward each other, the Axis, and the United Nations (especially the U. S.).
3. Analyses of the psychological warfare campaigns currently waged in the area by the Axis, the United Nations, "neutral," and domestic governments, by means of radio, press, motion pictures, special agents, diplomatic representatives.

In the following report, Part One presents the basic social information concerning the various groups which compose the population of North Africa, together with the pertinent attitudes which prevail among them. Part Two describes North Africa as a propaganda target and analyzes the various psychological warfare campaigns currently waged there.

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PART ONE

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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE AREA

A. Population Facts

North Africa includes a total area of 1,076,203 square miles¹ divided as follows:

| | |
|-----------------|---------|
| Algeria | 847,500 |
| Morocco | 152,120 |
| Tunisia | 48,313 |
| Spanish Morocco | 18,350 |

The total present population is estimated to be eighteen to nineteen million. According to French 1936² census figures (the latest available), there are over a million Europeans in North Africa, a million of whom are French. Other Europeans, mostly Spanish and Italian, total about 350,000. The percentage of Europeans is highest in Algeria (13.6%) and lowest in Morocco (3.3%). Moslems, including both Berbers and Arabs, number over fifteen million. A third significant category is that of the Jews who number today about 430,000. (250,000 in 1936)

Most of the population is concentrated in the northern fertile areas, since most of the southern inland region is desert. Many of the important cities - Casablanca, Oran, Tunis - are on the coast.

¹ Area figures from the World Almanac, 1942.
² Population figures from the French Annuaire Statistique for 1936.

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B. Political Divisions

The whole area of Northwest Africa is in the hands or under the "protection" of two European powers, France and Spain. Italy also has claims, especially on Tunisia, but has thus far been unable to enforce them.

The French regions include Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Most of this area has been brought under French control by force of arms during the twentieth century.

Algeria consists of two separate administrative areas. The northern territory (area, 80,117 square miles) is divided into three Departments:

Algiers - population of 2,240,911

Oran - population of 1,623,353

Constantine - population of 2,727,768

Under the Third Republic, each of these Departments sent one senator and three deputies to the National Assembly, which alone had the right to legislate for Algeria.

Today, under Petain, the principal administrative agent in Algeria is the Governor-General, Yves Charles Grével, who is responsible to the French Minister of the Interior (Laval).

The Southern territory (area, 767,435 square miles) forms a separate colony, under a military command, which acts with the authority of a governor and has a separate budget. The Southern territory has a population (1936) of 642,651.

Morocco called Ifni. Spanish Morocco is a protectorate nominally ruled through a Khalif, as a representative of the Moroccan Sultan in Rabat.

C. Social Groups

For the purposes of psychological warfare there are a large number of significant social groups in North Africa to be considered. Their cultural differences and conflicting interests seriously complicate the problems involved in attempting to influence opinion in the area. First, there are the all pervasive religious categories, which for many groups affect their whole cultural sphere of life. The largest group, the Moslems, number approximately 15,000,000 and include Arabs and Berbers, urbanites, peasants, and nomads. There is considerable variation in sect and orthodoxy among this wide variety of Moslems, but they have a strong solidarity vis a vis Christians and Jews. A second important religious group is the

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Christians, including most of the Europeans (French, Spanish, Italian) and a few native North Africans. The Jews constitute the third important group. The Jews live mostly in the cities, but there is considerable variation among them. There are three main types: (a) the early Palestinian Jews who settled in North Africa after the breakup of the Hebrew nation in Palestine, (b) the refugees from Spain in the fifteenth century (Sephardic Jews), and (c) the recent refugees from Europe. Strong antagonisms exist between and within all these North African religio-cultural groups.

Another set of categories into which the population of North Africa may be divided is based on nationality. The French form the predominantly political group in Algeria, Tunisia, and French Morocco; the Spanish in Spanish Morocco and the small enclave of Ifni. Italians are numerous in Tunisia, and some British-Americans and Americans are to be found throughout the area. The numbers of British and Americans declined sharply after the fall of France. Among the native peoples of North Africa there are three important groups, each of which is a cultural entity: the Berbers of the West, the Arabs of the cities of the East, and the old Jewish population of the urban areas.

Finally, there are occupational groupings, each with its own special interests. In the south and west live

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the nomadic Berbers and Tuaregs, who are relatively independent of European political control. In the farming areas of Morocco live Berber peasants, while in Algeria much of the agriculture is carried on by French colonial settlers. The urban areas, especially in Morocco and Tunisia are largely made up of Arab and Jewish merchants and workers, with a nucleus of French and Spanish administrators and military men. Some of the cities in Algeria, on the other hand, are largely European, composed of a French working class and a bourgeois group under the administrative control of French civil officials.

D. Basic Economy

Along the coast of North Africa is an area 50 to 100 miles wide called the Tell, which is a land of fertile plains and valleys. It is largely owned by French settlers, especially in Algeria, who raise grains and vegetables, some for export to France. In the warmer parts of this region olives, almonds, lemons, oranges, grapes, and dates are raised. In both Algeria and Tunis cork is produced.

In the mountains of the northern area, lead, iron, phosphate, and zinc are mined, much of it for transhipment to France, there being practically no local industry in North Africa other than handicrafts. These resources are now, of course, largely under the control of Germany.

| | Number of French | Per cent of French Population | Per cent of General Population |
|-----------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Tunisia | 100,000 | 4.2 | 30.7 |
| Algeria | 145,000 | 10.4 | 24.4 |
| French Morocco | 165,000 | 8.7 | 75.1 |
| Spanish Morocco | Very few | | |
| and Tangier | | | |
| French Algeria | 1,000,000 | 6.2 | |

The French are especially numerous in Algeria both absolutely and relatively. In Tunisia, owing to the large number of Italians, they form scarcely more than half of the European population. In Spanish Morocco, although they are a majority of the Europeans, they constitute but a small minority of the total population (2.2%). In Spanish Morocco and Tangier, they are present in only insignificant numbers.

^a The figures in this section are for 1936. The figures mentioned in the preceding table are probably approximate, but the relative numbers are probably not far off. The different tables give very slightly different figures.

^b For Tunisia, Algeria and French Morocco only.

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II. PRINCIPAL SOCIAL GROUPS

A. Europeans

1. The French¹

a. Place in the total population. The 1,009,000 French in North Africa are the dominant non-native group there, constituting about 6 per cent of the total population and three-fourths of the Europeans. They are not uniformly distributed among the principal political units of the country, however, as the following table shows.

Distribution of the French Population 1936

| | Number of French | Per cent of Total Population | Per cent of European Population |
|-----------------------------|------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Tunisia | 108,000 | 4.1 | 50.6 |
| Algeria | 745,000 | 10.3 | 84.4 |
| French Morocco | 156,000 | 2.5 | 75.3 |
| Spanish Morocco and Tangier | Very few | | |
| North Africa | 1,009,000 | 6.2 ² | |

The French are especially numerous in Algeria, both absolutely and relatively. In Tunisia, owing to the large number of Italians, they form scarcely more than half of the European population. In French Morocco, although they are a majority of the Europeans, they constitute but a small minority of the total population (2.5%). In Spanish Morocco and Tangier, they are present in only insignificant numbers.^{1,2} In Northern Algeria, 70 per cent of

1 All figures in this section are for 1936 (the latest available). The absolute numbers have probably increased, but the relative numbers are not likely to be significantly different today.

2 For Tunisia, Algeria and French Morocco only.

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- b. Historical background. By far the largest proportion of the French element in the European population of North Africa dates only from the time of French occupation of the various regions. The occupation of Algeria dates roughly from the middle of the last century, that of Tunis, from 1881, and that of Morocco, from 1908-1912. During her occupation of North Africa France has played the role of an imperialist nation seeking to exploit the material resources of a backward and undeveloped country. Her successful completion of military conquest was followed by the creation of political structures providing for the systematic colonization and exploitation of the regions. Subsequent to the creation of the appropriate political and administrative machinery, large numbers of civil officials, agriculturalists, artisans, and industrial overseers were induced to emigrate into the new territories. These persons and their descendants form the present French element of the European population in North Africa.
- c. Important social groups and classes. The majority of the French in North Africa are residents of cities, although in Algeria the farm population is fairly large. In Northern Algeria, 75 per cent of all Europeans are urban, and the proportion for

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the French is probably but little less than this.

In Tunisia and Morocco where there is decidedly less agricultural settlement, the proportion of the French who are town dwellers is certainly higher.

In French Morocco, an overwhelming majority live in the two cities of Casablanca and Rabat.

The French urban population is made up of civil officials; merchants, industrialists and petty bourgeois; and (in Algeria) an urban proletariat. Additional groups are the military and the agricultural settlers.

(1) Civil officials. The number of administrative employees of the state is large in North Africa, although exact figures are not available. It has been estimated that there are from 70,000 to 80,000 civil servants in Algeria, and if this proportion holds for French Morocco and Tunisia, the total number must approach a hundred thousand. To them perhaps ought to be added an unknown number - including some members of the Legion des Combattants and others - whose livelihood depends directly or indirectly upon the State. These people perform the ordinary tasks of colonial and civil administration, and in addition the extra-ordinary functions which the government has assumed in the face of France's defeat and in the name of the National Revolution.

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(2) Merchants, industrialists, and petty bourgeoisie.

The bulk of the urban French in North Africa fall into this very general class. Industry is not highly developed, and most of these people are probably employed in commerce.

(3) The urban proletariat. So far as is known, there is no large French proletariat except in Algeria where the longer occupation has facilitated the development of a more completely stratified French population. The exact size of this group is unknown.

(4) The military. While the size of the army in North Africa is limited by the terms of the Armistice, there is some reason to believe that the limitations are being evaded, at least in a small way. Probably there are not many fewer than 100,000 French soldiers in the area. A number of these are in the Air Force. Special concessions in the way of high pay, long leaves and other advantages have reportedly been granted to this army which is thought by some observers to be designed ultimately to fight again against Germany, but by others to be intended for use against the United Nations in alliance with Germany.

There are also a fairly large number of sailors and French naval officers in the ports.

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(5) Agricultural settlers. In French Morocco there are two kinds of colonists: "official", aided by the government, and "private", receiving no official aid. In 1925, the nominally Europeanized area was about 1,400,000 acres. Of this total, about 950,000 acres were "private" and 450,000 "official." By 1931 430,000 more acres were, by one means or another, put into the hands of French citizens. This process was frequently accompanied by fraud and sharp dealing.

In Tunisia, French colonists are engaged chiefly in viti-culture. Out of 125,000 acres cultivated in the whole of Tunisia, the controle of Tunis has 58,500, of which the French own 30,000.

This acreage is distributed among 637 owners. In the controle of Gambolia out of 50,000 acres 15,000 are owned by 147 Frenchmen. It is interesting to note further that in the northern Tell

region, the French own 92 per cent of European-owned land, but represent only 40 per cent of the total European cultivators involved in the area.

In Algeria where, of 987,252 Europeans, 853,209 are French by birth or naturalization. European colonists occupy 5,900,000 acres of land. This land is distributed among 70,000 European land-owners.

The French of North Africa very

is probable that opinions are formed in much the same way as in France; viz., in the late afternoon, Frenchmen purchase newspapers and sit down at a sidewalk cafe to read and discuss the news. Cafes and papers are likely to be selected in terms of previous biases, and collective opinions are arrived at regarding the various developments of current events.

Two conditions which may interfere with this process in North Africa today are the strict governmental control of the press, and the fact known to the French that there are many informers and secret police agents on the lookout for anti-Vichy opinions.

e. Ideologies and religion.

(1) The colonial-imperial ideology. Although it is variously reflected in the attitudes of the several classes, the French of North Africa very

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generally share in what may be called the colonial-imperial ideology. They feel that France has done much for the native peoples and will do more in the future and that those peoples ought to be properly grateful for favors rendered. If native dissention assumes the form of open revolt, they expect it to be suppressed by the application of force, and they take such suppression pretty much for granted.

They have worked hard in the area, and according to their own values have aided in civilizing it. That they have also benefited themselves extensively through the exploitation of cheap native labor to the disadvantage of the native peoples, or that they have seriously infringed native rights are ideas which do not occur to them.

In particular, they are inclined to feel that while French administration has not been perfect, it compares favorably with that of other European colonial powers, and in particular that theirs has been a better North African administration than the Spanish have exercised in the Spanish zone of Morocco.

(2) The reactionary traditional ideology. Many of the North African French are definitely rightists, especially among the higher administrative officials

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the wealthier merchants and industrialists, the military officers (naval officers in particular), and the large landowners. The conservatism of these people parallels and complements their colonial-imperial mindedness, and is linked to the prevalent Catholicism of the bulk of the French population. It finds expression in opposition to liberal or radical ideas and has re-

- f. Recently provided the basis for such whole-hearted
- (1) support as the Vichy regime possesses.
- (3) The liberal-democratic ideology. Although expressions of this ideology are suppressed among the North African French today, supporters of a liberal-democratic point of view were numerous enough in Algeria to poll a very substantial minority vote for candidates of the Front Populaire in the 1956 elections. It is true that this is less significant than it might seem because of the concentration of the French proletariat in that area, but because Algeria contains over three-fourths of all the North African French it is none the less meaningful. Among the lower bureaucrats, the workers, the rank and file of the army and navy, and possibly among the small farmers there are still many who still support this ideology.

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It must not be supposed that liberal-democrats are by definition opposed to colonial-imperialism, however. Many French enemies of reactionary-traditional ideas as they manifest themselves in Petain's "National Revolution" would also stoutly defend the righteousness of France's imperial record in general and of her North African record in particular.

f. Basic social attitudes

(1) General considerations

(a) Difficulties. In attempting to assess the current attitudes of the French in North Africa, certain fundamental difficulties appear. Available sources are of a rather fugitive character, usually reflecting the opinions of one individual as he formulated them at a particular time and place and on the basis of necessarily limited observations. Were such sources in general accord, their concurrence might be taken as rather positive evidence. Unfortunately, while there is some agreement among the sources, there is much outright contradiction and even more interpretational variation.

Part of the confusion in the sources arises from attitudinal confusion among the French

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themselves. The shock of the fall of France, the material difficulties many of the French North Africans have had to face since 1940, the lack of any clear understanding of what the Vichy government intends in the way of

- (a) "collaboration", or in the way of "national reconstruction", the ambivalent situation in which the French patriot who has always hated Germany finds himself when told that loyalty to France now means collaboration with Germany - these and many other conditions have produced in the thinking of a great many French North Africans conflicts so serious that they must be said simply not to know their own minds.
- What follows then is an interpretation of French attitudes which has been derived from inadequate sources and which inevitably oversimplifies the picture, presenting it as much more clear-cut than it actually is.
- (b) North African localism. It is reported from several sources that the French residents of North Africa do not entirely identify themselves with France. Indeed, many of them seem to feel a sort of local patriotism and to be somewhat resentful of any exploitative activities of the mother country in North Africa. This local patriotism probably must

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be kept in mind in assessing the remarks made below, since the North African will not only consider what is good for France but may sometimes differentiate between the good of France and the good of North Africa.

(2) Attitudes toward Vichy

(a) Favorable. There is considerable support for the Vichy government in North Africa, largely derived from the hope that Vichy policies may mean the survival of France. For many people this is tied up with the tremendous reputation of Petain, who is said by some to be virtually a cult hero. There are, however, some among the French who are not taken in by the Petain worship, particularly the higher civil and military officials. While they are definitely pro-Vichy, they must be thought of also as using the Marshall's reputation to gain the support of the masses.

Support for the Vichy regime is apparently very strong among the civil authorities, but appears to become less so as one descends in the civil hierarchy.

Naval officers are very ardent Vichy supporters, but their loyalty is perhaps more directly to Darlan than to Petain. The caste traditions of the French Navy, together with its traditional

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anti-Semitism and the officers' traditional dislike of England, enhanced by the Mers-El-Kebir affair, fortifies them in their support of similar Vichy dogmas.

Among the enlisted men of the army and navy there are some Vichy supporters but they are less fanatical in their views than are the naval officers.

The army officers' corps also contain some Vichy supporters but apparently relatively few.

French agriculturalists tend to support Vichy because they identify their interests with it, as do some of the middle-class urban French.

(b) Unfavorable. Opposition to Vichy is probably the strongest among the urban workers, but many of the middle-class French in the cities, some of the farmers, many of the men in the army, fewer naval enlisted men, and some of the lower-bracket civil servants are also in opposition. The opposition to Vichy arises principally from an antipathy to collaborationist policy.

(c) The role of individuals. Aside from Petain's importance as a symbol for uniting the French, at least two other names must be mentioned. Darlan is apparently rather generally unpopular

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(3) Attitudes toward the Axis except in the navy. Naval officers have been hand-picked by him for their personal loyalty, and even naval enlisted men are said to feel some loyalty to him.

Including Laval is generally unpopular - presumably because of his open pro-Germanism - and it is probably safe to assume that he is liked by very few. It is naturally opposed by all those who support Vichy. Moreover, there has been some recognition of De Gaulle's endeavor to assume a political, instead of a merely military role. Thus, the considerable opposition to collaboration and to Vichy, however as it is taken to mean collaboration, has not been reflected in a corresponding pro-de Gaulleism.

It is probable that the close connection between de Gaulle and the English is a part of the reason for his lack of vital popularity. (See below, section C.A.)

(4) Attitudes toward the Axis

(a) Germany: Except among the members of the higher civil administration and among the military leaders, particularly the naval officers, there is a fundamental opposition

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(3) Attitudes toward the Fighting French.

De Gaulle has always had a few supporters in North Africa, especially among the workers and among the rank and file of the army, including non-commissioned officers. Some army officers are also reported to support him.

In general, however, the Fighting French cause has not been popular. It is naturally opposed by all those who support Vichy. Moreover, there has been some resentment of De Gaulle's endeavor to assume a political, instead of a merely military role. Thus, the considerable opposition to collaboration and to Vichy, insofar as it is taken to mean collaboration, has not been reflected in a corresponding pro-de Gaulleism.

It is probable that the close connection between de Gaulle and the English is a part of the reason for his lack of vital popularity.

(See below, Section 6.a.)

(4) Attitudes toward the Axis

(a) Germany. Except among the members of the higher civil administration and among the military leaders, particularly the naval officers, there is a fundamental opposition

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to Germany and to German ambitions.

Much of this feeling remains latent,

and in the minds of many it is probably combined with a loyalty to Vichy. That

is to say, a great many North African Frenchmen have probably not really faced

the issue of choosing between loyalty to France (Vichy) and opposition to the

Germans.

It is possible that support for Germany

(4) Attitudes toward Germany is more widespread than the sources examined

(a) indicate, and probably those who are loyal to Vichy must be counted as at least potentially pro-German.

(b) Italy. Italian expression of claims to Tunisia have produced strong hatred and fear of Italy there. One report even asserted that anti-Axis feeling was stronger in Tunisia than elsewhere in French North Africa simply because of the residents' fear of Italy.

(5) Attitudes toward Spain

For the French inhabitants of Morocco, Spain occupies much the same position as does Italy for the Tunisian French. Spanish ambition to unite the two Moroccan zones under her own

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authority has been openly expressed and has created great concern among the French.

It is usually assumed that any Spanish expansion in Morocco would be accomplished with German support, and this, paradoxically, places the French administrators who tend to favor Germany in the curious position of having to act contrary to what they suppose are German interests, because of their determination to hold the Empire together.

(6) Attitudes toward the United Nations

(a) England. North African Frenchmen seem to be nearly unanimous in their distrust of England, and many of them are openly anti-British. Apparently it is generally felt that a British factory will not necessarily benefit France. Those most strongly anti-British are the civil officials and the military officers -- particularly the navy -- who are also most strongly collaborationist. The British attacks on Oran, Syria, Madagascar, and German-controlled areas in France have produced a deep hatred of the English among many Frenchmen. In addition, there is considerable fear that England may attempt

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to seize for herself portions of the French Empire -- or at best may attempt to deprive France of them.

There is some pro-British sentiment among those French citizens who most desire to see the end of collaboration and who most fear the Fascist tendencies of the Vichy government. Rank-and-file soldiers, urban workers, some of the lower bureaucrats and small tradesmen -- those groups who in the past have supported the popular front government -- contain many individuals who see in a United Nations' victory France's best hope. Of these people, many recognize that England's victory is an essential part of a United Nations' victory.

(b) United States. Reports are as uniform in indicating pro-American sentiment as they are in indicating anti-British sentiment. The United States is felt to be genuinely disinterested and is, therefore, not distrusted. Moreover, the United States is fighting a war against the old enemy, Germany, and has been able to conduct the battle without engaging in any direct

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attacks on French soil or French citizens.

Finally, the old tradition of Franco-American friendship (as contrasted with Franco-British enmity) may still influence some attitudes.

There is some anti-American feeling among the collaborationists and those groups which are most strongly pro-German.

Some reports indicate that while the army or navy might be willing to fight the British, they would be reluctant to fight Americans.

In short, only those who conceived of France's future as necessarily linked with a Fascist new order are very strongly anti-American. For the rest, either a mild friendship is felt for America or else a strong pro-Americanism, arising from the feeling that only America can save France or the North African French from ultimate German domination.

(c) Soviet Russia. Apparently, the most prevalent attitude toward Russia is one of opposition. Those who support Germany or collaboration, are, of course, strongly anti-Russian on ideological grounds. But

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more than this, those who hope for a United Nations' victory also tend to feel that Russia and the Communists betrayed France and precipitated the war in 1939. These people, too, are anti-Russian.

There is some evidence of communist activities in North Africa, but it apparently involves only a very few individuals among the French.

(7) Attitudes toward native peoples

(a) Moslems. Almost without exception the French must be thought of as holding imperial-exploitative ideologies. They are eager to benefit themselves by their North African activities, and they tend to rationalize this by asserting that France has accomplished a great civilizing mission in the area.

Currently, most French, especially officials, are somewhat uneasy about the native population and fear that the prestige they have lost because of the fall of France may ultimately lead to a native rebellion.

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The French fear of a Moslem uprising has been expressed in special concessions made to these people. For example, they have been granted differentially favorable food rations and are less severely punished for black market trading.

(b) Jews. Toward the North African Jews, the

French who support Vichy take fairly strong anti-Semitic attitudes. Others are less anti-Semitic, although the attitude is present even among many who hope for a United Nations' victory.

There is little or no discrimination against the Jewish population, but the Moslems experience considerable discrimination, as about two-thirds of them stand at approximately the bottom of the social scale, in regard to such things as education, health services, and employment opportunities.

Some of the Frenchmen's more progressive anti-Semitic attitudes change markedly according to the subject and situation; the women of certain tribes are given greater equality than others.

The French now have the largest Moslem army in Africa and have made some progress in their understanding of Moslem and Arab anti-partitionism. In this connection, they are actively supporting some Moslem leaders, the Moslem

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I. AUDIENCE CONDITIONS

A. Relevant to Radio

1. The principal listening groups

Audience conditions in North Africa present a complex picture involving three distinct French-controlled areas and one small but politically important Spanish-controlled territory. The French, making up some 6% of the total population in French North Africa, own over 80% of the radios. For French Morocco, it is estimated that one Frenchman in five has a radio; for Algeria, where the French population is largest, one in nine. The Moslems of these areas average around one radio per thousand. The Jews in Morocco -- the only French area for which we have separate data -- have about one radio per sixty people. For Tunis we have no figures for the separate racial groups, but the over-all figures for radio distribution are about the same as those found in Algeria. In the absence of specific data, we might expect a parallel distribution in Spanish Morocco.

Among the "natives," radio propaganda gets its widest circulation through public listening in tea shops and through the spread of rumors which may have their origin in radio broadcasts.

The French thus form the largest listening group, with the most and the best radios. Since many of them are government officials and hold the position of power in French territories, they are probably the most important group. However, the Moslems

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in both urban and rural areas constitute the bulk of the population, and the Moslem elite, if accessible, could be very important listeners.

The native Jews form a smaller minority than do the French, less than 2% of the total population. In their way of life, they are much closer to the urban Moslem than to the French. In influence they are unimportant. However, they are somewhat more accessible to radio broadcasts than are the Moslems.

2. Types of receiving sets

Most of the sets come from Holland and the United States. France and Germany also export radios to the area, and a few are exported by Great Britain. (Figures for 1937: Holland 2293, U.S.A. 1665, France 852, Germany 690, and Great Britain 143).

Most sets are of a cheap variety, averaging less than 800 francs in price, and so relatively few of them can be expected to include short wave receiving facilities. During the last few years, however, there has been an increase in the import of German short-wave sets.

There is a strong desire to own sets in the urban areas, and dealers in radios, when they cannot import sets, buy up old ones and recondition them.

3. Obstacles to listening

There are probably enough receiving sets, both long wave and short wave, to make radio propaganda to the area effective, which operates through one-man discussions and the like.

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worthwhile under peacetime conditions. However, since November 1940 public listening to foreign broadcasts (including apparently the German and Italian) has been forbidden, and in October 1941 the ban was extended to private listening. In addition to these prohibitions, the French government has resorted to the jamming of foreign broadcasts, making reception difficult on ordinary sets in those urban areas which are not equipped for wave lengths below 19m. British, American, Free French, and Russian broadcasts are selected especially for jamming operations, but a few people continue to listen despite the obstacles.

B. Relevant to Printed Material

1. Literacy

Precise figures on literacy in French and Spanish North Africa are not immediately available to us. In Algeria some four million out of the total population of six million are supposed to be illiterate. In Morocco, and possibly in Tunis, we might expect illiteracy to be still more widespread. We have not yet secured figures on the numbers literate in Arabic as compared with French.

2. Other considerations

Material has not yet been gathered on the extensiveness of the postal service or other media for the transmission of printed material. Presumably, however, the literate among the native population form an opinion-spreading elite, which operates through tea-room discussions and the like.

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This elite is concentrated in the cities, but even in the remote parts of the country there are individuals who can read, and who would have the responsibility of communicating to others the contents of any written or printed materials which might get into the area.

Vichy French & French Colonial

Extensive local broadcasts in Arabic, French from local stations at Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, Oran, Constantine, Bone, Casablanca, & Fez.

Public listening to Vichy & local broadcasts encouraged.

Strict government control of press. Most papers pro-Axis, though a few in Algeria and Tunisia attempt neutrality.

No information on Arab language press of French North Africa

War news largely pro-Axis, anti-Semitic, Fascist. Film production under German control. Vichy and Axis soon to have monopoly on motion picture supplying.

Spanish

Communist in Portugal seems very closely with Axis.

Spanish and Arabic programs from Tetuan. Other stations at Melilla & Malaga.

Reported to have fifth-column in French areas. No accurate, reliable information, etc.

Spanish language press in Spanish Morocco is pro-Axis, slightly anti-Vichy. Arab language press boasts two Moroccan nationalist papers, pro-Axis, anti-Vichy, anti-Ally, critical of some Spanish controls.

War news largely pro-Axis, anti-Semitic, Fascist. Second war declared.

German

Communist in Portugal seems very closely with Axis.

Six Arabic, three Moroccan programs per day from Berlin, Paris, Athens, & Monaco. "Voice of Free Arabs" freedom station in Arabic. Seven programs from Paris in French. All short wave.

Monthly radio magazine, Al Jahir. Propaganda news sheet, Barid ash-Sharq. Tangier consulate distributes a weekly pamphlet, Nashrat al Akbar. These publications quoted in Arab nationalist press of Spanish Morocco.

War news largely pro-Axis, anti-Semitic, Fascist. German newreels distributed, effective. German control over French production increases.

Italian

Four Arabic grams per day from Rome, Bari; four medium wave from Tripoli. "Preaching station of Arab People" freedom station in Arabic. Italian from Rome & Tripoli. French from

Monthly mag Mundo Arab & radio mag Radios Bari. Italian, Bari and Berlin programs.

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LIST OF RIVAL PRO-PAGANDA AGENCIES IN NORTH AFRICA

Italian CONSULAR United States Great Britain

Other
United Nations

Miscellaneous

OPPONENTS' FACILITIES

ITALIA

Four Arabic programs per day from Rome, and Bari; four on medium wave from Tripoli. "Broadcasting station of the Arab People's ~~PALESTINE~~ freedom station in Arabic. Italian from Rome & Tripoli. French from Rome.

Five Arabic programs daily. Five French, two Italian, Five Spanish.

All shortwave, almost all OWI, News, commentary, music.

Banned, Jammed.

Four Arabic, one Moroccan program daily from London. Also, Arabic from Cairo and other British-Arabic short-wave stations.

News, Talks, music.

Banned, Jammed.

Musala, in French, Turkey, daily Jammed and banned. in Arabic, popular, trusted.

Fighting French, in French from Brazzaville, in Moroccan & Arabic from Beirut. Banned, Jammed.

Brazil, Arabic program to North Africa reported -- Iran, news in Arabic on short waves.

ENGLAND

Monthly magazine, Mundo Arab; ~~radio magazine, Radio Bari~~ with Italian, Tripoli, and Berlin radio programs.

Information Bulletin, pamphlets, and Roosevelt's speeches distributed from Consulate, in French, Spanish, Arabic.

The Arabic Listener, radio magazine, distributed in North Africa. Popular.

(For Arabic Nationalist press, see under Spain.)

PAGANDA LI

MOVIE AND MOTION PICTURES

American features still popular in North Africa. May be banned by 1943.

| <u>Spanish</u> | <u>German</u> | <u>Italian</u> | <u>United States</u> | <u>Great Britain</u> |
|--|--|--|---|--|
| Consulates in French areas, work closely with Germans, organize Arabs, Spanish, & Italian residents, encourage native Moroccan nationalities in French held areas. | German consulates very active in propaganda in Spanish and French Morocco. Armistice Commission also an effective propaganda agency. | Italian consulate in Tunis active. Italians also on Armistice Commission. | CONSULAR ACTIVITIES American consulates in Tangier, Casablanca, Algiers, Tunis. Printed material distributed. | A consul remains at Tangier only. |
| Reputed to have fifth-column in French areas, to encourage Moslem discontent, etc. | Reputedly numerous, operating as Geologists, newspapermen, etc. Gestapo operates freely in Spanish Morocco. | Active in Tunis, but Germans reported dissatisfied. | SUBVERSIVE AGENTS | |
| Differential rationing favors native population. | Provide needed manufactures, spend freely, promise much. | | ECONOMIC PRESSURES AND REWARDS | Relaxes blockade to permit passage of supplies to North Africa. |
| War news largely pro-Axis, with token "neutral" inclusions. | Enthusiastic over Axis Russian and Libyan victories. Second Front ridiculed. | Usual stress on Axis military prowess, with special emphasis upon Rommel and the Libyan campaign. In Arabic transmissions promises are made of Axis "liberation" of Egypt and the Near East. | PROPAGANDA LINE WAR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES | German losses and Russian resistance Allied activities in Far East. Air and Naval strength in Mediterranean. British morale. |

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Miscellaneous

Italian

United States

Great Britain

Other
United Nations

lates
in
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French
nistice
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Italian consu-
late in Tunis
active. Italians
also on Armistice
Commission.

American consu-
lates in Tangier,
Casablanca,
Algiers, Tunis.
Printed material
distributed.

A consul remains
at Tangier only.

Japan: a consu-
late at Casa-
blanca.

CONSULAR ACTIVITIES

SUBVERSIVE AGENTS

umerous,
news-
tc.
rates
spanish

Active in Tunis,
but Germans
reported dis-
satisfied.

"Communists"
frequently arrested
in French areas
for propaganda
activities.

ECONOMIC PRESSURES AND REWARDS

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Provide consider-
able foodstuff
and manufactured
articles, more to
come.

Relaxes blockade
to permit passage
of supplies to
North Africa.

PROPAGANDA LINE

WAR STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

ess on Axis military pow-
er, special emphasis upon
the Libyan campaign. re-
transmissions promises
of Axis "liberation" of
the Near East.

German losses and
Russian resistance.
Allied activities
in Far East. Air
and Naval strength
in Mediterranean.
British morale.

Ankara: hard-
headed evaluation
of the war situa-
tion, slightly
pro-Allied.

Copy of original document held by the National Archives - Washington, D.C.

My French & French Colonial

Find faith in retain, other leaders. Petain, Laval identified. Industriousness to rebuild French greatness. Anti-communism, anti-Semitism, pro-Catholicism.

Russia and Britain vilified. Germany praised. Italy occasionally praised -- though specific newspapers occasionally attack her. Silence on Spain. Arabic programs praise Turkey.

Only through faith in the Vichy gov't. will the French Empire be maintained and French glory re-established.

Moslem best interests lie with maintaining contacts with the French.

Spanish

Anti-Communism. Pro-Catholic in Spanish programs.

Pro-German, anti-Russian, anti-British, anti-U.S. Anti-Vichy attitudes partially condoned in the press.

To the Spanish, the glory of an expanded empire is held out. To the Moslem, concessions toward Moroccan nationalism, with implicit aim of bringing French Morocco under Spanish control.

German

Little positive ideology. Racial theory stretched to make Moroccans super-Africans and blood brothers of Germans, Italians, Spanish. Anti-Semitism the main theme. Also anti-Communism, anti-international monetary control, anti-imperialism, etc. Noteworthy is the strong stress on the ideal of "freedom".

Italian

IDEOLOGICAL AND

Usual line up: against the British, Russia, United States, Fighting French. Pro-Germany, Italy, Japan. Also favored are governments of Egypt, Palestine. Indian nationalists supported. On the surface, Vichy is supported.

ATTITUDES TAKEN TOWARD

APPEALS TO THE SELF-

Such appeals are a main topic of Axis Arabic programs. Flattery and Koran readings provided. Promises of Arab independence and unity made -- specific for British-Arab areas. The Mufti of Jerusalem and former premier of Iraq used in spreading this propaganda.

To the French audience: collaboration is the only means of maintaining the Empire, freeing the prisoners.

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| <u>German</u> | <u>Italian</u> | <u>United States</u> | <u>Great Britain</u> | <u>Other United Nations</u> | <u>Miscellaneous</u> |
|--|----------------|---------------------------------|---|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | | IDEOLOGICAL AND MORAL ARGUMENTS | | | |
| Little positive ideology. Racial theory stretched to make Moroccans super-Africans and blood brothers of Germans, Italians, Spanish. Anti-Semitism the main theme. Also anti-Communism, anti-international monetary control, anti-imperialism, etc. Noteworthy is the strong stress on the ideal of "freedom". | | | Anti-totalitarian, liberal-democratic, individualistic. Axis victory means loss of personal & religious freedom. Arabs fall into German "non-Aryan" classification. | | Ankara: Anti-imperialistic. |

ATTITUDES TAKEN TOWARD SPECIFIC COUNTRIES

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Vichy
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Usual line up: against the British, Russia, United States, Fighting French. Pro-Germany, Italy, Japan. Also favored are governments of Egypt, Palestine. Indian nationalists supported. On the surface, Vichy is supported.

Germany, Italy, Japan vilified. Russia, U.S. heroized. Non-committal re Vichy France. India, China, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, Turkey, used as testimonials.

APPEALS TO THE SELF- INTEREST OF THE AUDIENCE

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Such appeals are a main topic of Axis Arabic programs. Flattery and Koran readings provided. Promises of Arab independence and unity made -- specific for British-Arab areas. The Mufti of Jerusalem and former premier of Iraq used in spreading this propaganda.

To the French audience: collaboration is the only means of maintaining the Empire, freeing the prisoners.

For Arabs as for other peoples a United Nations victory means freedom and independence -- rather than slavery under the Axis. Stress on the quantities of food for North Africa allowed in -- shortages due to the Germans.

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II. VICHY-FRENCH PROPAGANDA

A. General

The Vichy regime, unlike any of the other agencies which we are considering, can treat its North African audience as a home population. It can use the established governmental and educational channels to carry its message, and at the same time can secure much closer contact with the recipients. The Vichy government has in North Africa the following effective media: an extensive administrative system; a well-controlled, if not subsidized press; extensive standard (medium) wave radio broadcasting facilities supplemented by short-wave programs from metropolitan France; and various official and semi-official patriotic organizations. Furthermore, it has one advantage which no other agency can claim - it may legislate so as to secure for itself a monopoly of audience attention. How thoroughly this has been done has been indicated above in the chapter on audience conditions and in the discussion of the press which follows.

B. Operations Facilities

1. General propaganda

a. Radio. Vichy, as we have just indicated, can cover the North African area with standard (medium wave) broadcasts, as well as with the less satisfactory short wave programs. In Algeria there is

Top Secret - Propaganda Planning Board: OSS Supply Division Planning - June 1943

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a chain of four stations, known as "Radio PTT Alger", with its principal studios in Algiers and transmitters at Oran, Constantine, and Bone. Morocco is served by Radio Maroc from Rabat, Casablanca, and Fez. Tunisia is served by Tunis National radio station.

French language news and feature programs are provided by all these stations. In addition, some fourteen different daily programs are beamed from Vichy to the North African area via shortwave. Five of these programs are relayed by the Algerian stations. The programs which originate in Vichy show little special preparation for the North African audience, with the exception of one program of personal messages. Short-wave programs in French also originate from Algiers and Rabat. All newspapers in French Marocco are written

All the Vichy controlled radio programs in Arabic for this area are medium wave programs from the local North African stations, with the exception of an unimportant Arabic news broadcast from Dakar. Except for Morocco, Arabic programs take second place to the French ones, although the former get considerable time on the air. Tunisia has five news programs per day, Algiers three, and Rabat three news programs and one talk

for Asia Minor, particularly Syria. These programs are occasionally monitored in this country, and provide us with a tenuous means of inferring something as to other Vichy-controlled Arabic programs.

Radio While the French population is adequately

supplied with private radio receivers, the Moslem

Vichy audience must be primarily reached through the

loudspeakers extensively found in cafes and tea

shops. Local or Vichy-French programs are the

only ones which may be legally heard over these

facilities. This gives the Vichy regime a fair

monopoly over the Arabic radio audience in French

North Africa.

b. Press. All newspapers in French Morocco are under

strict government control. Independent expression

is not permitted, although some of the more power-

ful papers can give a desired slant to the news

through headline manipulation. By and large, the

press policy is pro-Vichy and relative pro-Axis.

Axis communiques are reproduced in full, British

and United States communiques are abridged, usually

no as to stress weakness, and Russian communiques

have not been printed since April 13, 1942.

Petit Marocaine

Pro-German, anti-British
(may be German-controlled)

Soir Marocaine

Pro-Vichy (may be German-controlled)

Algeria

Oran Republicain

Attempts neutrality

L'Echo d'Oran

Anti-British, anti-Russian

Dépêche Algérienne

Collaborationist, less anti-British
than the Moroccan papers

L'Echo d'Alger

Stresses Arab-French unity, only
mildly anti-United Nations

Les Dernières Nouvelles

Collaborationist

(Algiers)

Algérie Soir

Only mildly anti-United Nations

Dépêche de Constantine

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Tunisia

Tunisie Française

Anti-Italian, often suspended as pro-British but accepts Vichy line

Dépêche Tunisienne

Pro-Vichy

Miscellaneous

Le Moniteur

Emphasizes Franco-Moslem units

L'Emancipation Nationale

Strongly anti-British, the organ of Jacques Doriot (published in France)

Journal Officiel

Organ of the Vichy Government

(Presumably other metropolitan papers also reach North Africa)

c. Films. French films and newsreels predominate in most regions of North Africa. They are scarcely distinguishable from German films in their general line. This near identity is established by the virtually monopolistic control over French film production through the Nazi dominated International Film Chamber.

2. Subversive propaganda

No direct evidence exists on French activities in North Africa which could be called "subversive." However, there is little doubt but that agents of various kinds are rather widely employed, and some of the activity of the police in this French-controlled area might be regarded as more or less paralleling the kind of activity usually referred to under this rubric.

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3. Diplomatic propaganda

Again the rubric is not directly pertinent, because Vichy France is the official government of the area. However, certain official and semi-official activities more or less duplicate the kind of effort usually achieved in foreign countries by diplomatic maneuvering.

Some illustrations are:

- (1) The government sponsors adoptions of bombed French cities by cities in North Africa. For example, Algiers "adopted" Le Havre and after English bombings raised money for the relief of that city by concerts, movie shows, and collections of food and clothing.
- (2) The Legion des Combattants is said to run centers for National Revolution and Legionary propaganda in Algiers, Casablanca, Tunis, and Oran. The tone of this propaganda is said to be very violent, and it presumably takes the form of posters, leaflets, as well as sponsored meetings.
- (3) The school administration changed the name of a boys' school in Algeria to "Pétain."
- (4) An educational camp for Arabic youth has been established in Algiers, which is to train young Moslems for leadership in the Chantiers de Jeunesse movement and in civil athletic and professional educational leadership.
- (5) The Vichy government has ordered the institution of a Brevet des Hautes Etudes in the Algerian-Moslem administration, which will presumably assist in transmitting the Vichy line to the natives.

4. Economic propaganda

Little information is available regarding Vichy's economic measures of psychological importance to North Africans. However, it is known that the

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rationing system is differentially adjusted so as to favor the native population, who, for example, get 50 per cent more sugar than Europeans. In other respects, too, rationing is reported easier on the Arabs.

C. Propaganda lines

Sources of information on the Vichy propaganda line have included BBC analyses of the French North African audience, the BBC Near East Department's bi-monthly service reports, the News Digest for June and July, 1942, FCC transcripts of the Vichy North African broadcasts from July 30 to August 16, various State Department reports on North Africa, and other scattered references to radio and newspaper policy in North Africa.

1. To the French in North Africa

a. Arguments of strength and weakness

Vichy's lengthy news broadcasts to North Africa are heavily weighted in favor of Axis sources, especially German, although Italian sources are emphasized. Japanese sources, when quoted, seem to be given complete credence. However, evaluations of the military situation are usually much more nearly neutral than is the straight Axis line. This holds true of the Vichy programs in Arabic as well as in French. This is

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United Nations communiques and other sources
are largely garbled in such a way as to discredit
the United Nations' cause. Reports which show
weakness, disunity, productive failures, or mili-
tary defeats are selected for inclusion. However,
in January the shipment of United Nations food to
Greece was reported, and other "harmless" items
occasionally occur in the regular news transmissions.

The major stress, as in all Vichy propaganda,
is on France and French affairs. This fact, as
well as the slight concessions to neutrality
serve to make the propaganda quite distinct from
the Axis product.

b. Arguments of ideals, morals, war guilt, war aims,
and other ideologies

The principal ideological stress in Vichy-inspired
propaganda is on the National Revolution and the
greatness and worthiness of Petain as France's
greatest patriot, who, facing terrible problems,
is nevertheless determined to bring his mighty
task to a successful conclusion. More specifically,
the following points are constantly reiterated:

- (1) Simple faith and unquestioning obedience to
the Marshall in France's time of trouble is
demanded of all true Frenchmen. This is

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pointed up by prominent reporting of such news events as the motion of loyalty and devotion to Petain and Laval by 83,000 French and Moslem members of the Legion des Combattants in North Africa.

- (2) Petain's Labor Charter is hailed as a mighty accomplishment, which is gradually being realized in the labor organization of France.
- (3) France, though bleeding, is said to be still great. Metropolitan France is identified with the Empire, and the worthiness of complete self-sacrifice for the future of France is emphasized strongly.
- (4) The importance and necessity of working for France's future is pointed up by such examples as that of the Pasteur Institute, which never stopped working, even during the fall of France; the establishment of a synthetic rubber plant in North Africa; extensive reconstruction in France; the mighty achievement of French peasants, aided by volunteer town workers, in providing for an ample harvest; and the construction of the Trans-Saharan Railroad.
- (5) Every effort is made to win support for Laval by insisting that he and Petain are in "perfectly complete accord."

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Some pains are taken to emphasize the unity between France and North Africa by describing the visits of North African officials to France and of French officials to North Africa. Unity with North Africa is further stressed in terms of France's continuing to perform her noble colonial mission despite the sufferings she herself has undergone.

The Vichy line also contains much anti-communistic material, some anti-Semitic materials, and some pro-Catholic items which play up the resurgence of religion in France.

c. Attitudes taken toward specific countries

(1) England. Arguments are presented to the effect that the English are cowardly and villainous. In this connection the deaths of French men and women resulting from RAF raids on France are played up, with particular stress on the Paris bombings. The destruction of factories in these Paris raids are glossed over so as to give a picture of the RAF killing civilians but doing no significant military damage. The British seizure of Madagascar is referred to as "odious aggression", and previous British "betrayals", such as Dunkirk, Mers-el-Kebir, and

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(3) Dakar. Vichy writers in Dakar are recalled. It is alleged that the British intend to give Europe to Russia. The second front in France is described as being useless to the French, and, indeed as potentially productive only of more futile French deaths.

The Vichy line also presents England as weak and fated to lose the war. English military failures are exaggerated and weaknesses pointed up by allegations of disunity in India, South Africa, and Egypt. It is alleged that communist influence is growing in England, and that a serious morale crisis is brewing. Lack of shipping, due to successful German submarine operations, will, it is claimed, render any second front attempt abortive.

(2) The United States. Vichy propaganda relating to the United States is far less critical than is the propaganda relating to England. In general, American weaknesses are emphasized by the careful selection of news items which describe slowing of war production, the successfulness of the submarine campaign, and alleged moral apathy.

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- (3) Russia. Vichy propaganda is extremely anti-Russian and anti-communist. One North African paper -- Echo d'Oran -- regularly heads its reports on the Russian-German war; "The Crusade Against Bolshevism."

Russian weakness is alleged through the almost exclusive use of German reports of military activities, and in reports of serious fuel shortages within the Soviet Union.

Russian propaganda is specifically accused of lying to confuse those who hear or read it.

- (4) Germany. References to Germany are uniformly favorable. That the Axis will win the war is tacitly assumed. German strength is played up through the use of selected news items on the war. The German New Order is approved both by implication and by specific statement.

- (5) Italy. Italy, when mentioned, is usually treated either impartially or in a favorable fashion. Some newspapers occasionally include unfavorable items.

- (6) Japan. Japan is infrequently mentioned, except in connection with military operations which show Japanese success. One item mentions the "correct" Japanese attitude in Indo-China as a contrast to British aggression in Madagascar.

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(7) Turkey is given considerable favorable attention in the Arabic programs beamed to Syria and the Near East from Vichy. It is possible that this would also hold true for Arabic programs to North Africa. The treatment follows the general Axis line on Turkey, but seems genuinely sympathetic. Turkey's generosity in getting food into Greece and Iran (sic) her new achievement in building her own airplanes, and most of all her policy of neutrality, all are praised. Turkey is also prized as a source of quotations supporting the case for the Russian menace, United Nations weakness and the like.

d. Appeals to the self-interest of the audience

Vichy propaganda appeals directed to the French in North Africa emphasize their duty to the French State, and are based on the premise -- usually unstated -- that what is best for France is also best for individual Frenchmen. In this sense the ideological line as summarized in Section b. above may be said to represent an appeal to self-interest.

In addition, there can be no doubt that the administrative organization of French North Africa is such as to make many individuals directly depend upon Vichy good-will for their livelihood

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and personal advancement. Such people -- government officials, merchants, etc. -- are unquestionably influenced in many direct and subtle ways by the official propaganda line because it is in their interest to follow the line.

2. To the "native" population in North Africa

Only a little direct information is available on Vichy-inspired propaganda to North African natives. However, it seems clear that they stress Arab-French unity by playing up good relations between the French administrations of Morocco and Tunis and the native administrations under the Bey of Tunisia and the Sultan of Morocco. There is apparently some tendency to talk in terms of a Tunisia or a Morocco whose destiny (a great one, by inference) is "indissolubly linked to France."

The services of the French to the native peoples are described. A number of native Moroccans are reported to have been trained as assistant doctors, and a gift of 15,000 francs sent by Petain to an Algerian village (which had been named for him) for welfare purposes is publicized.

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III. SPANISH PROPAGANDA TO NORTH AFRICA

A. General

Spain's desire to expand in North Africa and her encouragement of Moroccan nationalism to that end are clear, but very little is known of the official Spanish propaganda directed toward Spanish Morocco or adjacent areas. We have no record of the content of any Spanish or Arabic radio programs from Spanish Morocco. We have only a fragmentary sampling of the local Spanish and Arabic language press, some monitorings of domestic Spanish broadcasts, and various reports on diplomatic and fifth-column activities.

B. Operations facilities

1. General propaganda

a. Radio. There are radio stations at Tetuan, Melilla and Malaga in Spanish Morocco. A third at Tangier has been reported as discontinued. The Tetuan station, and probably the others, broadcasts in Arabic. The Spanish audience can doubtless supplement the local broadcasts by listening to stations in Spain itself.

b. Press. The most prominent Spanish language newspaper in Spanish Morocco is España, published in Tetuan and Tangier. This paper is reported to be strongly pro-Axis (using the trans-ocean and DNB news services), pro-Nationalist Spain, anti-Communist, to some extent

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anti-American, and anti-French. In Tangier there
is also the pro-Vichy Dépêche and the pro-allied
Tangier Gazette, printed in French and English.

The Arabic language press is represented by the two
violently Moroccan nationalist papers, Al Murriya
and Al-Wahda al Maghribiya. These papers presumably
have some illicit circulation in French Morocco.

c. Films. We have no information on the kind of Spanish-produced movies distributed in Spanish Morocco, or of any being distributed in other parts of North Africa. It seems unlikely that special movies are prepared for the Arabic population.

2. Consular and other agents

Spain has consulates in most of the important towns in French North Africa. Those in Morocco have been reported as engaged in fifth-column activities, organizing natives and Spanish and Italian residents (especially in Fez and Dijda), and facilitating communications between French and Spanish Moroccan nationalists.

In all French North Africa, reports indicate that Spanish consuls are working closely with German representatives, smuggling agents into the country via Barcelona, preparing maps, and reporting Allied sympathizers. There is every indication that Spain is actively organizing so as to be able to expand her North African holdings at the opportune moment.

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Currently, the presence of 140,000 troops in Spanish Morocco serves as a constant threat to France -- a threat which is probably manipulated more or less at the will of German strategists.

C. Propaganda lines

1. Arguments of strength and weakness of Axis vs. Allies

The assertions made by Spanish radio stations, both for home and foreign consumption, are explicit on this point. Axis successes on the African and Russian fronts are greeted enthusiastically, and frequently claims are made for them which exceed in optimism those made by the Italian and German stations. The word "enemy" is frequently used to denote not only the Russians but the British as well. The Spanish stations are practically unanimous in belittling any United Nations attempt to establish a second front and predict a warm reception for it should it be attempted. Any such attempt, it is asserted, is indicative of the low morale prevailing within the Anglo-Saxon nations and of the catastrophic military and political conditions prevailing in Russia.

The Spanish and Arabic press of Morocco treat the war situation in a similar way.

2. Arguments regarding ideals, morale, war guilt, war aims

Vituperation is confined chiefly to Russia and Communism. Much is made of the presence of the Spanish Blue Division

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on the Russian front. Messages to individual members of the Division, sent by some member of his immediate family, are a regular feature of Madrid broadcasts.

The anti-communist bias, and a more emphasized anti-Semitic line are to be found in the Arab press of Spanish North Africa. "Yesterday, today and tomorrow, communism is the one danger that exists for European countries."

3. Attitudes taken toward specific countries

Spanish broadcasts never fail to point out on which side the "Spanish bread is buttered." Thus, in one broadcast it is asserted "The Spanish Government owes its existence to the Axis rather than to popular support." In another broadcast, after praising "Three years of Franco's peace," it was asserted "Spanish people know to whom this treasure is due."

Russia is singled out for continuous and unvarying animadversions. This characterizes the utterances of Franco himself as well as those of the regular broadcasters.

No references were made to French North Africa in any of the Spanish broadcasts examined. However, the Spanish language, and especially the Arabic, press in Spanish Morocco is strongly anti-Vichy. The papers are occasionally fined for such attacks. The fact that these papers continue to operate under Spanish censorship, and the fact that the Arabic papers favorably contrast the Spanish attitude toward Moslems with that of the French,

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lead one to infer that this anti-French line is a definite part of Spanish policy and reflects Spanish territorial ambitions.

4. Appeals to the self-interest of the Spanish audience

This aspect of the broadcast material reflects a desire to win the support of the people for the work being done by Franco's government at home and for Spanish expansion abroad.

The programs telling of the internal reorganization and construction being pushed forward by the Caudillo describe (1) construction of war and merchant ships, (2) improvement of port facilities, (3) enlargement of naval bases, and (4) establishment of Falango del Mar, an organization for keeping seamen under the control of the Party.

Supplementing this are plans for imperial expansion. Listeners are frequently assured that Spain will one day "become one of the most important economic nations in Europe." "The soul of Spain longs for Empire." "The natural door between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic belongs to Spain, and nobody can pass it without her consent." "The Canary Islands can control Atlantic navigation lines and may be a first-rate base for submarine operations. Spain turns her face to the sea for Empire."

As we have implied above, Spain seems to be attempting to increase her control in North Africa through the Arab or Moroccan nationalist movements. The Arabic nationalist press, which is allowed to flourish under, as yet, mild censorship, puts forth very strongly pan-Moroccan movements, seeking in this not only the union of French and Spanish Morocco, but also modification of Spanish rule.

The newspaper Al-Hurriya is the organ of the National Reform Party. It defends Spanish rule as being free from the European colonial tradition, but seeks reforms from Spain, including greater freedom of the press and alterations in the administration of justice, education, public health, and morality. Its attitude is not always friendly toward the Spanish administration. Specific officials, particularly those out of office, are strongly criticized.

The newspaper Al-Wahda al-Maghribiya is the organ of the Moroccan Unity Party. It is similar in aim to Al-Hurriya, although some rivalry exists. It is more favorable to the Spanish rule and is generally milder in tone. It has at times advocated pan-Arabic Fascism. Both papers reprint German Arabic propaganda, copying articles from the German propaganda publications and giving publicity

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to the activities of the Axis Arabic puppets, the Mufti and Rashid Ali. Both are violently anti-Jewish, anti-Communist, anti-British, anti-Vichy, anti-de Gaulle, and pro-Axis.

The Mufti is a deeply anti-Semitic. His chief supporters were the Egyptian Viceroy and the various Arab Kings. Most of the German and Italian personnel are influenced by racial as well as political considerations, notably by the Arab influence in the German-dominated colonial enterprises. However, their opposition, significant to progress especially proposed for women, is also said to furnish some practical North African, where it is reported to be quite effective.

We shall not attempt to make specific to the Mufti's position to the Arab population in the British, French, or Italian territories in North Africa. The general idea of his propaganda to these peoples is well known and has been repeated so often and so recently, as the last several paragraphs, in connection with, notably, the recent interview with the Arab League and the recent publication of their official "Statement."

In these statements to the Arab world - it can be clearly understood - the German and Italian personnel dominate. Undoubtedly, the Arab element in both countries, the actual government, the Arab League, and the Arab Nationalist parties, are not without their own particular influences, but their statements, however, do not seem particularly clear. The various governments make apparently

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IV. AXIS PROPAGANDA TO NORTH AFRICA

A. General

Axis propaganda to Arabic speaking countries is as intense and as effective as Axis propaganda has ever been to any audience not directly under its control. The full dress campaign dates from the Ethiopian War and was initiated by Italy. Most of the German and Italian propaganda, as represented by radio at least, is selected and prepared mainly for the Arabic audience in the British-controlled Moslem countries. However, this propaganda, supplemented by programs especially prepared for Morocco, is also sent to French and Spanish North Africa, where it is repeated to be quite effective.

We shall not attempt in this report to do full justice to the Axis propaganda to the French, Spanish, or Italian audiences in North Africa. The general line of Axis propaganda in these languages is well known and has been reported elsewhere. Moreover, as far as general propaganda is concerned (i.e., radio, movies, and printed material), the Axis propagandists seem to make little or no special preparation for these colonial Europeans.

In their propaganda to the Arab world -- if not to other audiences -- the German and Italian propagandists cooperate very effectively. For this reason we have treated the actual content or "lines" of the German and Italian agencies together. It has been convenient, however, to treat their facilities for the various propaganda media separately.

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B. Operations facilities -- German

1. General propaganda

a. Radio. German or German-controlled broadcasts for North Africa are all short-wave, and are primarily in three languages. In French there are some seven programs daily beamed from Paris. In Arabic there are five daily news programs from Berlin and one daily from Athens. Berlin also broadcasts a weekly program of German youth calling Arab youth. These are intended for the Arab world as a whole and can be heard in North Africa. Three broadcasts in the Moroccan dialect are sent out daily, two from Paris and one from Berlin. There is reported to be a new German station concentrating on Arabic broadcasts at Monaco. Nothing is known of its programs as yet. The Germans are thought to control the anonymous station calling itself the "Voice of Free Arabs." It is known to send out two programs per day on the short-wave bands. It is apparently intended mainly for Egypt and is reported frequently, if not always, to employ an Egyptian dialect of Arabic.

b. Press. The Germans put out a monthly magazine called El Jahir ("The Voice of Truth"), an illustrated radio magazine. This is brightly colored, with many illustrations, and is presumably modelled on the British Arabic Listener. It is circulated mainly in

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North Africa. The Germans also publish a propaganda news sheet, Barid ash-Shara. A weekly magazine, Nashrat al Akhbar, using classical Arabic, is distributed in Morocco from the German consulate at Tangier. These publications have been fairly frequently quoted in the Arabic Nationalist press in Spanish Morocco. It is reported that one of these latter papers, Al-Hurriya, is German subsidized.

c. Films. A large supply of excellent German newsreel material finds its way into North Africa, mainly through French newsreels. These are especially effective in showing German military might. Other propaganda films are also present. The number of features which Germany is able to supply is not extensive, nor are they overly popular. A more important channel of German influence is through Goebbels' control over the French film industry, under which French movies are becoming increasingly Nazified. These French-produced and other Axis films are expected to have a complete monopoly in French North Africa after the end of this year. For more details, see the general section on cinema below.

2. Consular and other agents

Since the beginning of 1942 Germany has reestablished its consulates in French North Africa. Besides the routine consular work, these consuls and their numerous aides

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are reported to spend much time on intelligence and propaganda activities. Theodore Auer, the German Consul at Casablanca, was previously economic advisor to the Armistice Commission, in which capacity he was supposed to have carried on extensive propaganda and espionage.

There is no indication that these activities have stopped.

In Algiers the German Consul Pfeiffer reputedly makes strong attempts to win over the "society leaders." He also is said to watch carefully the activities of the American Consuls and to cover an area from Tunisia to West Africa in his various activities. At Tangier the latest German Consul, Dr. Kurt Rieth, reputedly outdoes his predecessor in propaganda activities. This Consulate openly distributes the German news bulletin in Arabic (described above), which is rabidly anti-British, anti-Semitic, and anti-Communist. The fact that the new German Consulate is located in the palace of the former representative of the Sultan of Morocco, who was removed when Tangier was occupied by the Spaniards, has angered not only the Sultan but also many Moslems. At Tetuan a large consulate headed by Drs. Richter and Braun is thought likely to be engaged in propaganda activities.

The German and Italian Armistice Commissions reputedly have a great propaganda value in French North Africa. Their only job legally is to watch over the administration of the Armistice terms in this area. This task, however, gives

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the commissioners an opportunity to travel over all the country, making detailed investigations, and even to establish contacts with local sympathizers on the side.

The French have tried to prevent the latter activity by close supervision and by insisting that all contacts with natives be made through French liaison officers. Moreover, Frenchmen or natives who are discovered in contact with these commissioners are severely punished. Nevertheless, these men present a potential threat to the French, since they are staffed by officers competent far beyond the formal demands of their jobs, and because the fact of their presence, as well as the impressive uniformed figures they cut, emphasize German strength. These men and other German nationals have created considerable good will by paying generous prices and being free with money in general. The size of the Armistice Commission has varied. Toward the end of 1940, 260 Germans and 430 Italians were reported on its staff. More recent reports indicate that the personnel has been considerably reduced. In Morocco there were only 80 commissioners in May 1942.

Unconfirmed reports tell of extensive activities on the part of German agents. These agents reputedly have as one major task the observation of United States Consuls as well as their fellow Italians. A German geological expedition is reported to have made an areal survey, obtaining some 3,000 photographs. Dr. Claus of the

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Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung recently made an extensive trip through North Africa, ostensibly as a reporter.

Reports place most of the German agents in Spanish Morocco, where they are supposed to have the cooperation of Spanish officials. German secret police are said to have the right to demand the arrest of anti-Axis persons, and Gestapo and counter-espionage officers visit Spanish Morocco openly. These freedoms, however, have not prevented the Germans and Italians from complaining about the strict control and supervision which the Spanish government exercises over them in Morocco.

3. Economic pressures and rewards

In their economic warfare in North Africa the Germans have made some efforts to win the good will of the local population by furnishing badly needed articles and selling them below cost. This activity has been reported especially in French Morocco, where warehouses have been established for electrical fixtures and bicycle parts. Since many Arabs use bicycles, the latter articles have been most useful in creating the impression of German consideration for the nation. The Germans are supposed to have shipped about 200 million francs of goods into Morocco from January to June, 1942. Most of these goods consisted of electric and kitchen utensils, paper, school supplies, and hardware.

C. Operations facilities -- Italian

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1. General propaganda

a. Radio. Italian broadcasts for North Africa are in French, Italian, and Arabic. French programs from Rome, while intended mainly for metropolitan France can probably be heard in North Africa. Italian broadcasts from Rome to the Italian Empire can doubtless be heard in Tunisia and Algeria. In addition Rome broadcasts a bi-weekly program of talks and personal messages for Tunis. It seems likely that medium (standard) wave programs in Italian from the strong Tripoli station can be heard in a good part of French North Africa. Italian broadcasts to the Moslems of this area use only Arabic, as far as is known. There are three daily programs from Italy beamed to the Arab world in general, and one program in Arabic beamed solely to North Africa. All these programs go out over the Rome short wave transmitters. Most of them originate, however, at Bari, and receive medium wave transmission from there. In addition, the late evening broadcast gets medium wave transmission from Rome and Genoa. Arabic news programs, four daily, are also sent out from the medium wave transmitter at Tripoli. These are not relays of Rome or Bari programs. While they are doubtless primarily intended for the Moslem population of Libya, they are probably the most

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effective of Italian broadcasts in reaching the Moslems of French North Africa. The Italians are frequently given credit for the anonymous station calling itself the "Broadcasting Station of the Arab Peoples" which is beamed to all the Arabic lands.

b. Press. Italy publishes and distributes a monthly magazine called Mondo Arabo. This is now all in Arabic, with the numerous pictures being captioned in both Arabic and Italian. A radio magazine called Radio Bari is issued either monthly or quarterly. It contains articles and the Arabic broadcast schedules of Bari (see above), Tripoli, and Berlin.

2. Consular and other agents. Italian Consulates in Tunisia and Algeria have been in operation since the beginning of 1942. They have been reported busy recruiting local Italians for work in Libya.

The Italians apparently make up at least half the Armistice Commission personnel, as described above under German Propaganda.

Italian agents, dealing mainly with intelligence, but presumably also with propaganda, operate in Tunisia and to some extent possibly in Algeria. It is reported that the Germans do not consider this service up to the mark, and are developing their own intelligence personnel service in Tunisia.

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Among the Italians in Tunis and Algeria, the Fascist organization is openly active, wearing its regalia and celebrating Italian victories. For this special audience, such activities are very effective propaganda.

3. Economic pressures and rewards

Presumably Italy can do little in this field. Italian broadcasts do, however, complain of food shortages in Tunisia.

D. German and Italian propaganda lines

The German and Italian propagandas to this area are very well coordinated, including the two anonymous "freedom" stations. Illustrating best their close tie-up are the joint statements of policy which have been issued on at least two occasions, and their joint use of the two puppets, the ex-Premier of Iraq, Rashid Ali al-Gailani, and the ex-Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al Husseini. These matters are taken up more in detail below. This close cooperation makes it more expedient to treat their propaganda lines together.

1. Arguments to convince the audience of the certainty of Axis victory

There is the usual Axis portrayal of military strength and victories, and of United Nations weakness and defeats. There has been, of course, a great deal of special emphasis upon Rommel and his recent African campaign. Similarly, there are many references to British weaknesses in the Near East and her difficulties

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in suppressing native populations. A very important feature of the Axis transmissions in Arabic (a feature lacking in their programs in other languages) were the strong promises in June of taking Egypt and invading the Near East. Currently these promises or predictions have disappeared. Such promises were usually stated in the form of "freeing" the Arabs from British rule. Here is a typical quotation from Berlin in June, referring to Jerusalem: "the Arabs are naked and the Jews have plenty. May death take all of us away because it is better to die than suffer a bitter life. No, no. We are coming very soon. I say, we are coming at once to free you." More such quotations could be found for Egypt.

2. The use of ideological and moral arguments

The use of Nazi-Fascist ideology in its unique positive features is practically non-existent. Dictatorial and authoritarian government is not advocated. On the contrary, the term "democratic" is occasionally used as a positive stereotype, describing the Arab way of life. Freedom (mainly national not individual) is an important appeal. Of the negative ideology there is much more use. Anti-Semitism is the most important theme on all the Axis Arabic programs. This takes on a virulence unexcelled by Axis propaganda in any area. The main examples, of course, are taken from Palestine. We have quoted a fragment of such propaganda above. Anti-communism is another main

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argument. Anti-imperialism and destruction of the British controlled monetary system are other aims claimed for the Axis war effort.

3. Attitudes taken toward specific countries

Most favored in the Axis broadcasts are Germany, Italy, and Japan, to which are ascribed all virtues, especially that of altruism for the Arab peoples. It is perhaps worth noting that Japan is played up on Italian and German programs, following in this regard Japan's own propaganda line to Moslem countries. Such propaganda goes to the fantastic height of claiming 20,000 Japanese Moslem converts and 60,000 Russian Mohammedan refugees in Japan. Japanese hegemony over Java and her anticipated hegemony of Indian Moslems are also exploited as proving Japanese importance in the Moslem world, as well as her good wishes.

Spain is given very weak support, stronger in broadcasts in the Moroccan dialect. Isolated references to France are favorable, in one case opposing her to England as a Moslem power to which the Arabs should be loyal. Axis appeals to the pan-Arab movement avoid mention of French Moslem countries. Parallel to this, German propaganda in French attempts to exploit the French desire to retain her colonies -- showing collaboration to be the only means. There are, however, indications that German propaganda operating from Spanish Morocco works with Spain in exploiting Arab nationalism against French rule.

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Turkey is very much prized as a source of quotations in all propaganda in the Arabic language. These quotations are so selected as to be favorable to the Axis arguments on whatever point in question. Egypt and her government are currently treated as genuinely opposed to Britain and therefore to be sympathized with. Brutal British domination prevents their opposition becoming more active. The current government in Palestine is treated in the same way. For Arab transmissions, Italy, at least, bids the Moslems be sympathetic with the activities of the Indian Congress Party, claiming that any move to oust the British is desirable. From all the British occupied lands, especially Iraq and Iran, come innumerable reports of Arab revolts and discontent with British rule.

Next to the Jews, Britain is the major hate-target. The two themes are often fused. A long British history of double-dealing with the Arabs is recounted. All kinds of atrocities, from robberies to rape, are attributed to the British. The British are said to be starving not only the countries which they occupy, but also the French Arab countries. Russia, of course, is attacked, the principal theme being the abhorrent nature of communism and the Russian maltreatment of her own Moslems and the Iranians. Diatribes against the United States attempt mainly to identify her as Jewish controlled: "American statesmen are all Jewish or staunch friends of the Jews. The meeting (between Roosevelt and Weizman) must have been a happy one.

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The two have been the greatest factors in bringing about this war, without which their happiness and well-being become non-existent . . . may God curse them again and again." This quotation is just one small sample of the exploitation of United States and United Nations assurances to the Jews regarding the future of Palestine. The Gaullists (Fighting French) are much despised on both Arabic and French programs, being usually described as a particularly depraved variety of Frenchman who has sold his soul to the British.

4. Appeals to the self-interest of the audience

Such appeals take up an exceptionally large proportion of transmissions in Arabic. (We are unable to report in any detail on appeals to the self-interest of the French audience in this area. The claim that collaboration is the only way to preserve the French Empire has been discussed above. The return of the prisoners of war is another argument used specifically with the French.)

On the Arabic transmissions there is a great deal of what we may describe as out and out flattery and entertainment. German and Italian programs are regularly headed by Koran readings, which are reputedly popular. Italian programs especially emphasize the Arabic intellectual contributions to the world, asserting Columbus' dependence upon Arabic astronomical writings.

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The Italians report themselves to have established an Arabic University in Italy. To Morocco the Germans have given a special racial theory, "the Moroccans surpass all other tribes in Africa in their civilization . . . their blood is mixed with Italian, German, and Spanish blood . . . a super African race . . . , [with a] blood relation" existing between them and the Germans. Other reports have it that the Germans claim Hitler to be descended from some Arabic stock.

The main appeal to the self-interest of the Arabs is the Axis support of pan-Arabic nationalism. This has been done in a number of dramatic ways. An initial statement by Italy and Germany in October, 1940, asserted complete Axis sympathy with the Arab cause and Arab attempts to regain position in the world. In their recent anticipation of the conquest of Egypt, a joint statement was issued declaring the Axis intention to establish complete Egyptian independence and autonomy. Contemporaneous interpretations of this statement asserted that it set the policy for Arab countries in general (with the British occupied areas being most nearly specified).

Possibly even more important than these promises to Arab nationalist aspirations, are the two major Arabic puppets who in the main carry this message. They are the former Premier of Iraq, Rashid Ali al-Gailani, and

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the former Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al Husseini.

Both these persons have spoken on important occasions this spring, from either Rome or Berlin, with the programs usually relayed from both stations. Likewise frequent interviews with them are quoted, even over one of the anonymous "freedom" stations. The German propaganda news sheet in Arabic likewise makes use of their photographs and articles. One major occasion for joint declarations by these two persons was the July 6 Axis declaration on the freedom of Egypt. Another important one was the May 2 anniversary of Rashid Ali's revolt against the British in Iraq. This was an occasion for much honoring of martyrs, damning of the British, and similar propaganda. Coupled with all these appeals are the frequent assertions of lack of any selfish interests on the part of Italy or Germany.

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V. JAPANESE PROPAGANDA TO NORTH AFRICA

Japan has made elaborate plans for propagandizing the Moslem peoples. Arabic broadcasts from Tokyo are heard in Iran, but apparently not elsewhere. Since March 1942, a Japanese consulate has been established at Casablanca. In general, however, it is improbable that Japanese activities in North Africa are extensive.

The general Japanese line is to assert religious tolerance, to emphasize a purely fictional Moslem population within Japan, to identify the Japanese war against Western countries with the Arabic holy wars, and to regard the Arabic peoples as one of the groups of Asiatics which are freeing themselves from British and European exploitation. We have already indicated how Italian and German propagandas carry the Japanese religious appeals to the Moslems. There is also considerable glorification of de Gaulle, both as a military and political leader. Occasional broadcasts support the Pan-Arabic ideology.

One would expect the Vichy French to have considerable underground propaganda activities in North Africa. The general nature of our reports, however, would indicate that such activities are less than in metropolitan France.

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VI. FIGHTING FRENCH PROPAGANDA TO NORTH AFRICA

De Gaulle's propaganda is disseminated by radio, both in French and Arabic. From Brazzaville are directed the regular Fighting French broadcasts, which can be heard in North Africa. From Beirut, French, Moroccan, and Arabic short-wave programs are beamed to North Africa. Broadcasts in French under Fighting French auspices are also sent by short wave from London and can probably be heard in North Africa, at least to the extent that short wave from London can be heard there at all.

We know nothing of the content of the Moroccan or Arabic broadcasts. The Fighting French line in French transmissions is well enough known. It appeals to all Frenchmen to continue to fight on the Allied side and thus preserve the French Empire and its glory. There is also considerable glorification of de Gaulle, both as a military and political leader. Occasional broadcasts support the democratic ideology.

One would expect the Fighting French to have considerable underground propaganda activities in North Africa. The general nature of our reports, however, would indicate that such activities are less than in metropolitan France.

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VII. SOVIET PROPAGANDA TO NORTH AFRICA

Russian broadcasts in French can be heard in North Africa, unless jammed excessively, but they are reported to have little audience. There are no reports of any Russian broadcasts in Arabic. Russian interest in this area is demonstrated, however, by a broadcast to America giving considerable detail on illicit German propaganda activities in the French-controlled regions of North Africa. It seems unlikely that the Russian line would give much support to the French claims to a French Empire.

Our only indications of subversive propaganda lie in the fairly frequent reports of sentences pronounced upon "Communists" in French North Africa. Spreading propaganda and participating in illegal organizational activities are the crimes described in these cases.

Such was Amble's program to the Amble world in general as well as from several British-controlled regions, namely from Derry, Monaghan, Belfast, Dublin, and Cork. The only one of these cities to be incorporated in the single fully sovereign Irish state was Belfast. These colonial stations are completely merged, although under British jurisdiction. Their distinctive programming has programs and are run separately from each other.

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VIII. BRITISH PROPAGANDA IN NORTH AFRICA

A. General

British propaganda to North Africa is directed primarily to the Moslems and the French. The principal media are radio broadcasts and economic propaganda as waged through selective relaxation of the blockade.

B. Operations facilities

1. General propaganda

a. Radio. For the French audience, there are seven short-wave news programs per day from London which can be heard in this area. These programs are not particularly prepared with the North African audience in mind, being the same as those sent to metropolitan France. Arabic programs are sent from London four times a day. Three of these are news, and one includes special features. A single program in the Moroccan dialect is broadcast from London each evening. This service includes music and special talks by a popular Tangierian.

Short wave Arabic programs to the Arabic world in general are sent out from several British controlled regions, notably from Cairo, Aden, Ondurman, Delhi, Bahrein, and Gambia. The only one of these likely to be important is the single daily short-wave news broadcast from Cairo. These colonial stations are independently managed, although under British censorship. They infrequently re-broadcast BBC programs and use BBC prepared transcriptions.

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- b. Press. The only specific information available on British periodical propaganda in North Africa is that the Arabic Listener, printed in Arabic -- an illustrated magazine with a children's page, radio broadcast schedules, etc. -- is distributed there and seems to be very popular.
- c. Films. No evidence of British activities.

2. Consular and other agents

British consuls have been withdrawn from French territory, but at Tangier a British consulate is still in existence.

3. Economic pressures and rewards

Through relaxation of the blockade in specific instances, the British allow food and other articles to get through to North Africa, in attempts to maintain the good will of the French and Arabic populations.

Authoritative reports indicate that these moves have been in some instances so inefficiently managed as to have had a negative effect. Tea, for example, has fallen into the hands of profiteers who actually the outrageous price the charged on the British blockade.

This situation is fortunately being remedied.

c. Propaganda lines

1. Arabic transmissions

- a. Arguments stressing United Nations strength and Axis

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selected so as to emphasize United Nations strength in relation to the Axis. This line is usually made specific in the following ways:

- (1) Russian successes against Germany are played up in terms of territory recaptured, prisoners taken, Germans killed, and supplies captured.
- (2) United States and Anzac air raids on Japanese bases in the southwest Pacific are stressed in such a way as to imply considerable damage done.
- (3) British patrol activities in Libya are presented as successful.
- (4) Convoy activities in the Mediterranean are described in terms of the repulse of Axis air or sea attacks.
- (5) The resistance of Malta to Axis air attack is played up as is the success of RAF raids on Axis communications in the Mediterranean.
- (6) Reinforcements and supplies arriving in the Middle East are described.
- (7) English achievements in the war to date are summarized.
- (8) American production figures are quoted.
- (9) British resistance in Burma and casualties inflicted on the Japanese are stressed -- no admission that the British are losing the battle of Burma at this time appears.

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- (10) It is claimed that the British and United States Navies are successfully blockading Europe, so that the Axis is being strangled.
- (11) Growing strength of the RAF is referred to in terms of raids on Germany.
- (12) British morale in terms of tremendous eagerness to make all sacrifices for the war is played up. Only Russia, it is said, is at present more thoroughly devoted to the military effort.
- (13) Japanese victories are said only to increase British determination.
- (14) It is claimed that Germany has lost the diplomatic struggle for South America, as is evidenced by many South American Republics' breaking off diplomatic relations with the Axis and by German submarine attacks on South American vessels.
- b. Arguments pertaining to ideals, morals, war guilt, war aims, and war ideologies
- In general, ideological arguments vilify the totalitarian ideas of Germany and Japan and glorify the democratic ideas of the United Nations. Specifically, it is asserted that:
- (1) Japan and Germany glorify the state above all else. They seek to suppress the freedom and independence of all other nations and not only subordinate religion to the state, but actually repudiate religion.

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- (2) Axis propaganda is deceitful, and frequently attempts to spread outright lies regarding Moslem affairs. This claim is repeated several times in the two weeks' period, particularly in reference to alleged disturbances in Iran and to the alleged intrigues of the Shah and his wife.
- (3) An Axis victory means loss of freedom and independence to all nations, whereas a United Nations victory is the only hope for freedom-loving peoples.
- (4) In one talk it is suggested that the glories of the Arab past can have a reconnaissance in future Arab unity based on the Atlantic Charter.
- (5) German racial ideology is interpreted to claim that the Arabs are inferior in one transmission.
- c. Attitudes taken toward specific countries

- (1) Germany. Germany is said to be brutal, irreligious, an enemy of Islam (German atrocities against Polish Moslems are cited). It is alleged that only Germany eats well in Europe because of her plundering of occupied territories. The necessity to prevent such plundering in the Arab world is emphasized.
- (2) Italy. There are few specific references to Italy in these transmissions. Largely they imply that Italy is militarily weak.

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(3) United States. References to the United States include those stressing American production, American ideals as exemplified in the Atlantic Charter, and American lease-lend aid, especially to Middle Eastern countries.

Principal emphasis in references to the United States is upon the unity of America with other United Nations. This is brought out in terms of the MacArthur appointment as South Pacific Commander and in terms of the Stilwell appointment as Commander of certain Chinese armies.

(4) Russia. Russian strength and determination to defeat Germany are emphasized in news bulletins.

(5) France. The few references to France in these transmissions are scrupulously non-committal. A minor Free French victory in Africa is mentioned, and France is taken as a leading example of German plundering in Europe.

(6) Other countries. Various other countries are referred to in such a way as to stress their good relations with England or with others of the United Nations. For example, the interchange of visits between British officials and Moslem officials in Egypt, etc., are played up; Chinese Iraqi friendship is stressed; the good will of England in sending Cripps to India is played up, as is British-Irani friendship, Anglo-Ethiopia

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friendship, and American-Turkish friendship.
The English stress aid given in shipping, subsistence allowances, etc., to Indian Moslem pilgrims.

d. Appeals to Arab self-interest

These appeals stress principally the alternatives of freedom and independence if the United Nations win, as compared to suppression and slavery if the Axis wins. In addition, since March 19, BBC has conducted a vigorous campaign to publicize quantities of tea, sugar and cloth which have reached North Africa from the Allies. This campaign has included the charge that any shortages in North Africa must be due to German robbery.

2. BBC French service

In the main, BBC French transmissions seek to destroy the morale of Germans in France; to persuade the French that the Laval Government comes closer to representing German interests than true French interests and thus to destroy their support of the Laval Government; to create French belief in a United Nations victory; to persuade the French that England has no intention of seizing the French Empire; and to prepare French morale for the day when the French can be expected to cooperate actively with the allies.

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IX. AMERICAN PROPAGANDA TO NORTH AFRICA

A. General

American propaganda activities in North Africa are of relatively recent date, and possibly the most effective forces building America's relatively favorable reputation have been unofficial and unplanned -- have been, for example, the presence of American manufactures in North African markets and American movies in the local theaters. Current American efforts include diplomatic and economic measures and short wave radio programs. The United States attempts to reach with its messages of democracy and strength the Moslem majority and the nationals of France and Spain.

B. Operations Facilities

1. General propaganda

a. Radio

The United States broadcasts to North Africa and to the Arab world five Arabic programs daily. Of these, all but one news program originate from OWI. There are two news programs of fifteen minutes each, one commentary program of fifteen minutes, and two programs of news and music combined of a half hour each. Five programs in French, three news and two commentary, are beamed to North Africa. These programs are also beamed to France and presumably prepared mainly with France in mind. Similarly, two Italian and five Spanish programs are sent to North Africa. All the programs in these three last mentioned languages are prepared by OWI.

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b. Press

From the American Consulates, notably the one at Tangier, an Information Bulletin is issued which gives general information on events in the United States, emphasizing speeches by prominent men and statistics about American production. Separate publications on such topics as American war production have been issued. President Roosevelt's speeches are being translated into French, Spanish, and Arabic.

c. Films

American films are still being shown in North Africa.

They are almost entirely pre-war feature films or animated shorts. These films are popular, but are only in a very general sense effective propaganda.

It is anticipated that beginning January 1942

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natives, interested more in their local problems than
in international politics, will follow the power which
can furnish them cotton cloth, kerosene, tea, soap, and
sugar -- all articles necessary to their way of life.

In 1941 an Economic Agreement was concluded between France and the United States which aimed at exchanging cork and olive oil for petroleum products, cotton cloth, and other products essential to the North African economy. An essential provision of this agreement stated that none of the goods sent should in any way help the Axis war effort. To enforce this provision American control officers were permitted to be stationed in the most important French ports of North Africa. With the dismissal of Weygand in November 1941 and the reentry of Laval into the French government the working of this agreement came to a temporary end. Negotiations were reopened during the summer of 1942, and both cargoes and boats were ready to resume the exchange in August.

Though part of a broader policy, the fundamental advantage of this agreement as economic propaganda lies in the recognition of the goods sent as American products. This condition was only partially fulfilled in the execution of the agreement during 1941. Bulk oil products reached the natives, but few of the distributors mentioned the origin of the product. The same was true of cotton goods, sugar, and other materials. Only a few of the educated natives knew of the working of the Economic

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Agreement. The local newspapers reported the delays in shipping created by diplomatic difficulties, but mentioned the actual arrival of ships only under the harbor notices. German propaganda minimized the importance of the agreement. Any future distribution of goods, especially kerosene and cotton goods, should in some way insure the recognition of American origin, by such devices as putting the products up in small packages and stamping American flags on them. Such a procedure might, however, encounter strenuous German objections and make it impossible for the French to admit the goods.

In 1941 the United States exported goods to the value of 129 million francs and imported products valued at 48 million francs. The unfavorable balance was ostensibly rectified by drawing on blocked French credits in the United States.

An Economic Agreement with Spanish Morocco is under consideration at the present time.

C. American propaganda line

We have not as yet been able to examine American programs in Arabic.

The American program is apparently directed first to the Moslem world. The latest available report on the situation (November 1942) indicated that only now are efforts being made to extend this program to other non-Arabic speaking countries of the Near East, particularly Turkey and Iran.

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X. MISCELLANEOUS PROPAGANDAS TO NORTH AFRICA

The most important of the miscellaneous propagandas to North Africa is the daily Turkish broadcast in Arabic. This broadcast is reputedly the most trusted news source among the Arabic population. It is possible that Turkish broadcasts in French can also be heard in this region. The primary content of Turkish broadcasts is a very hard-headed and slightly pro-Allied version of the world news. Ideologically, Turkey is anti-imperialist and regards British imperialism as on the wane. Turkey maintains a sympathy for France, often stressing German exploitation.

A British report tells of a short-wave program in Arabic beamed to the Arabic world from radio Difusora de São Paulo. The program, while intended for all Arabs, emphasizes Egypt, Arabia, Syria, and other Near East areas. The alliance between Brazil and Egypt is apparently emphasized. The programs may well be under the control of Arab immigrants in Brazil, and may thus reflect Arabic Nationalist sympathies. No reports on their reception are available.

Chungking broadcasts one daily program in Arabic to the Arab world. This program is apparently intended for India and Asia Minor. The latest available report on its content (November 1941) indicated that only news was given and that the program was almost completely unintelligible because of a combination of bad classical Arabic and a Chinese accent.

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Iran sends but a daily short wave news broadcast from Teheran in Arabic, intended for the Arabic world. We have no indication that it is ever heard in North Africa. The Teheran radio, though under the control of the Russians and the British, is not, as far as is known, actually run by them.

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XI. ROLE OF THE CINEMA IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIRECTED TOWARD
NORTH AFRICA

The data are first presented by audience-country, then summarized by country of origin. The report concludes with a statement of the potentialities of United States film exports in psychological warfare to North America, together with a statement of further information necessary for the technical implementation of this policy.

A. Algeria

1. Volume of films shown

In 1939 there were approximately 100 motion picture theaters in Algeria. The weekly attendance at motion pictures in Algiers is estimated at 25,000, for Algeria as a whole at 55,000. The double-feature program is well established. The average admission price ranges from 5 to 16 francs, with a minimum of 8 francs at the larger city theaters.

Up until September 1, 1941, by far the greater stock of available foreign films were American, despite the fact that probably no new features were added after the outbreak of war in 1939. A ruling which went into effect September 1, 1941, eliminated some 360 American films produced before 1937, whereas the total stock of German films available in Algeria was little more than 60. Sample tallies of film advertisements in two Algiers newspapers showed four out of four American films in the *Alger-Soir* of May 3, 1942, and 7 out of 22 in the *L'Echo d'Alger* of December 15, 1941. The

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Echo advertised only one German film in this same issue; the other 14 were apparently French in origin. During the week ending April 1, 1942, 12 of the feature films showing in Algiers were reported to be American, 11 French, 1 German. Non-feature films. During the week ending April 1, 1942, all the newsreels showing in Algiers were reported to be French; shorts and documentary films were 30 per cent French, 70 per cent United States; animated cartoons were 100 per cent United States.

2. Quality of films shown

Features. With the passing of the French film industry largely into German hands after June 1940, the French films transmitted to Algeria began to reflect Nazi influence. While this was especially true of newsreels and other propagandistic shorts, it may be presumed that the change in policy affected feature films as well, as was the case after 1937 in Germany itself. The American features shown in Algiers in December 1941, such as, for example, *Broadway Serenade* (1939), *Lost Horizon* (1937), *Andy Hardy Gets Spring Fever* (1939), *Young Dr. Kildare* (1938), *Test Pilot* (1938)

would seem on the whole to be relatively innocent of propaganda. By their popular entertainment appeal, however, they undoubtedly promote favorable sentiments toward the United States and may even dispose some of the audience in favor of American ideals.

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Newsreels. It is in this sphere that the Axis, working in many cases through French organizations, uses its most powerful screen medium for the formation of political attitudes.

Educational and Documentaries. No specific information.

Cartoons. American animated cartoons of the Disney sort appear to dominate the market in this type of film. Their propaganda value consists largely in their universal popularity.

Language. All non-French films are dubbed in the French language.

3. Local controls over films shown

German pressure on the Algerian motion picture industry is evidenced in three ways:

a. Elimination of Jewish personnel from all agencies concerned with motion pictures, including United States commercial representatives. Because of the difficulties involved in replacing personnel in the field, this measure has, in effect, increased German control. Elimination of Jewish personnel was completed by July 1941.

b. Elimination by September 1, 1941, of all films produced before 1937. This measure excluded 300 American films.

c. Censorship. Some 60 American films have been affected by this measure. The elimination of 360 films by the age ruling and by censorship has diminished

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The increased reliance by
United States film revenue in Algeria by 60 per
cent.

- d. Shift in French film production policy under German Pressure. In effect, the French features and shorts produced after June 1940 and shown in Algeria have been part of the general German propaganda campaign. Local theater owners find it expedient, despite their preference for American films, to accept a certain number of these Nazi-French films in order to avoid friction with the German authorities.
- e. Newsreel rulings. Newsreels must be included in every performance, must constitute not less than 10 per cent of the net showing time, and must be run "at a normal rate of speed." It is further probable that the audience is forbidden to leave during the showing of newsreels, as has been reported from other cities in French North Africa.

4. Audience reactions and preference.

There is clear evidence of the popularity of American films a year ago. While no reports on the other side of this question have come in since then, the continual showings of United States films two, three, four, and even five years old indicate continual demand. Eventually, however, without replenishing the stock (which has not been added to since 1939), the newer German and Nazi-French films, especially the artistically superior productions, like "Robert Koch", are bound to attract attention.

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The newsreel rulings indicate definite audience resistance to German propaganda documentaries, but enforced attendance at some of these highly suggestible films must contribute significantly to the formation of pro-Axis attitudes. In the absence of competing British or United States newsreels it can hardly be denied that the Axis has almost a free field.

Curiously enough, one unintended effect of the American "escape" films and animated cartoons may be to cushion the harsh effect of the Axis propaganda shorts. The United States films thus provide the bait which draws the crowds, who then, however unwillingly, are exposed to Nazi propaganda. From the standpoint of suggestion, the sharp stimulus of the propaganda has an opportunity to work into the subconscious while the audience relaxes over "Donald Duck." The joint United States-Nazi program as at present constituted may thus be more effective, from Goebbel's point of view, than a wholly German-produced program, which would be likely to leave the audience with a feeling of being surfeited with propaganda.

There is little evidence on the movie reactions of the non-European population of Algeria. Since very few films are dubbed in Arabic, however, and since relatively few Moslems have mastered French, it may be presumed that the film audience is predominantly

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European in composition. In fact, many
Casablanca Moslems living in remote areas probably do not
know what a motion picture is, let alone ever
having seen one.

B. French Morocco: no evidence of interest in motion picture

1. Volume of films shown

All films shown in French Morocco are imported, about 70 per cent of the total -- at least before the war -- being American, and most of the rest French. Investments by film distributors were estimated in 1938 at 22 million francs for the whole Protectorate.

In 1938 there were about 62 motion picture theaters, all wired for sound, with a seating capacity of about 266,000. The average admission price was 8 French Moroccan francs. The gross income from motion picture theaters in 1937 was just under 18 million francs.

Box office receipts have recently increased, partly as a result of the huge influx of refugees from Europe after June 1940, and partly because of the wartime tension and the lack of other amusements.

There were almost no imports during the year following the fall of France, although it is probable that the Germans now regularly supply Casablanca and possibly other cities with newsreels and perhaps other films. The following figures indicate the effect of the war on box office receipts and the relative importance of Casablanca in the motion picture trade:

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1939

1940

| | | |
|--------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Casablanca | <u>12,595,632 francs</u> | <u>17,661,912 francs</u> |
| Other cities | <u>14,772,610 francs</u> | <u>19,965,203 francs</u> |
| | <u>27,368,242 francs</u> | <u>37,627,115 francs</u> |

There was no evidence of interest in educational films in French Morocco at the time of the latest report on this subject (1938). None of the schools and colleges at that time was equipped with cinematographic apparatus, and there were no prospects for developments in this direction.

A report of April 25, 1941, from the United States Consulate in Casablanca indicated that no new motion picture theater construction was under way.

2. Quality of films shown

(See remarks above under "Algeria")

3. Local controls over films shown

Up until the war practically no American films were censored, provided they contained no anti-French suggestions or items likely to incite the natives to revolt. With the coming of the Pétain regime censorship has become more strict. All sex films, gangster films, and other films thought likely to have a deteriorating effect upon public morals or likely to provoke political disorders are banned. Agents, however, are able to satisfy these conditions by cutting out large sections of films before submitting

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them to the censorship bureau which is located at Rabat. Curiously enough the proportion of French films rejected has been relatively larger than that of American films, since many French films have been either of the gloomy "realistic" type, and therefore too depressing, or else light comedies based on amorous escapades and lacking in the "moral uplift" Vichy requires in every aspect of public entertainment.

The audience is prevented from leaving during a newsreel by the enforced payment of a second admission fee if they wish to return. Theaters post signs forbidding leaving during newsreels.

4. Audience reactions and preferences

Before the war the native audience was reported to prefer Wild West and other adventure films. The European audience probably preferred French films, but found relatively few of these as contrasted with American films, which, however, they appeared to like well enough.

A report of April 25, 1941, states that people seem to prefer comedies of the Laurel and Hardy type, adventure films, detective films, and cartoons of the Disney variety -- in short, escapist entertainment. They seem to dislike films showing luxurious living conditions, depressing films produced in France but not banned by Vichy, and propaganda newsreels.

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While most reports indicate resentment against Nazi propaganda newsreels and booing of Hitler when he appears on the screen, there is nevertheless impressive evidence of the effect of certain German films such as that based on the British bombing of the Renault Works in Paris. This newsreel was witnessed by two officials from the United States Consulate in Casablanca on the evening of March 20, 1942, in two different theaters. Their reports follow in full:

Mr. Sidney L. Bartlett:

"A masterful film of anti-British propaganda, horrible and realistic in all details, none of which were omitted. The handling of the dialogue was also well done, and covered all the usual anti-English phrases of 'our former allies, barbaric, open area, women, children, and workers', and closing with 'this latest Britannic outrage to be added and remembered with Mers-El-Kebir, Dakar, and Syria!'

"The rising reaction of the audience was very marked. Yells of 'Les salauds, les cochons, les sales Anglais, etc.', were heard from all sides and when the speaker wound up his dialogue as previously mentioned there was much applause from the spectators.

"The only slip made in this nightmare film of perfect propaganda was in one scene they showed a very badly damaged part of a factory on one side, instead of as in all the other scenes, damaged houses, dead and mutilated bodies, funerals, etc.

"It is hardly necessary to add that this propaganda film is another blow to any possible Franco-English collaboration at present in French Morocco, particularly with the strong influence of the French Navy here. Also being

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another confirmation that if ever any occupation is attempted here by one of the Allies, it should be an American affair, and not by the English. The French services, particularly the Navy, would fight the English with more willingness than resisting the Germans."

Mr. Donald Q. Coster:

"On the evening of March 20, at the Triomphe Theatre, I witnessed a showing of the latest news events before the feature picture. Other than a few minutes devoted to some glimpses of a football match, the entire news program dealt with the results of the recent British bombing of the Renault factory in Paris.

"The film itself was the best piece of German propaganda of this type that has ever come to my attention. Accompanied throughout by funeral music of the most macabre sort were scenes of death and destruction which were nauseating to a degree and which I am convinced have never before been witnessed on the screen. Only for one fleeting second was a glimpse of the ruins of the workshops themselves to be seen and at no time was the name of the factory or the fact that it was a logical military objective mentioned. Shown in the most complete detail were scenes of the destruction of private dwellings and the horribly mangled remains of women and children. At the pictures of the common graves and the funeral services proper, duplicate shots were continually repeated from different angles showing the coffins to be many more than there actually were and concentrating always on those of the children.

"As can be expected, this film had the most profound effect on the audience. Audible gasps of horror could be heard throughout the entire showing culminating in the fierce shouts of 'death to the British' and other similar phrases from a group of sailors from the JEAN BART who occupied seats directly in front and behind my own.

"In conclusion, I am convinced that this one showing of 'Actualities' has already done and

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will continue to do more to widen the Franco-British breach than any other propaganda conceived and executed as yet by the Germans."

C. Spanish Morocco and the International Zone

1. Volume of films shown

There were, in 1938, five theaters in Tangier and sixteen in the Spanish Zone (all equipped for sound), with a total seating capacity of about 12,500 or an average of 500 or 600 places each. The average admission price was 3 francs in Tangier and 1.50 pesetas in the Spanish Zone.

According to estimates received from the theater manager in Tangier, the average theater there takes in perhaps 2,000 francs a day, gross. This is based on three shows at 5, 7, and 9 p.m. daily. This would give an annual gross income of about 700,000 francs.

All films shown are imported, primarily through agencies in Spain. Approximately 90 per cent of all feature films shown in 1938 were American-produced, the rest being French and German, and dubbed in Spanish. Newsreels are either Spanish (Franco) or German. Production of Spanish features, being located in Barcelona, had little effect on Spanish Morocco until the reorganization at the end of the Civil War. The so-called International Zone is now wholly under Franco's control.

identifiable as American, 2 as German, 2 as English,
and 1 as French.)

3. Local controls over films shown

No evidence since 1938, after which the outcome of
the Spanish Civil War undoubtedly modified the
existing situation.

4. Audience reactions and preferences

Although the dominant language is Arabic, no films
are dubbed for the native audience. In the Spanish
Zone the film language is either French or Spanish.

In Tangiers, which is more polyglot, some American
films are shown with the original English dialogue.
Dubbing in French or Spanish is done in France or
Spain. ^{Box office receipts are estimated at about 4,000,000}

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The types of films most liked by the Moorish population are Western pictures with plenty of riding and shooting, or other adventure types with plenty of action. Sophisticated drawing-room stories, in which the action is mostly psychological, is apt to appeal more to the European film-goers. Nearly anything, however, is accepted as entertainment, which cinemas alone, in this region, are equipped to provide. (Review of Foreign Film Markets, United States Department of Commerce, 1938, p. 359)

For present reactions there is no direct evidence, but the situation may be presumed to be not unlike that in other areas of Northwest Africa where Axis influence is strong. (See discussion under Algeria, French Morocco, and Tunisia.)

D. Tunisia

1. Volume of films shown

There are at present 45 motion picture theaters in Tunisia, with a total seating capacity of 25,000 seats. Daily occupancy is estimated at 50 to 60 per cent of the total capacity per week. The average admission price ranges from 6 to 8 francs. Theaters are located in Tunis, Beja, Bizerte, Ferryville, La Goulette, Bagen, Le Kef, Sfax, and Sousse. The box office receipts are estimated at about 4,000,000

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frances yearly for the first-class theaters and at 975,000 francs for second-class theaters, with the smaller houses showing receipts of 100,000 to 220,000 francs per year. All motion picture theaters in Tunisia are wired for sound.

It is estimated that between 300 and 350 feature films are now required yearly to fill the demands of the Tunisian motion picture theaters. Only one positive print of each film is imported, the printing being effected in Marseille or Vichy from negatives available there. The principal competitors of American films in Tunisia are those produced in France, although American films still lead in popularity. For example, 75% of all feature films shown in Tunisia during the first ten months of 1940 were of American origin, with 15 per cent French, and the remaining 10 per cent English, Egyptian, Italian, and German. American films are well received in Tunisia, and the demand for them is said to be on the increase. The techniques used in dubbing in the French language appear to be improving. No native films are produced.

In La Depeche Tunisienne of May 4, 1942, seventeen motion pictures were advertised, five of which were definitely American, one German, and the rest probably French. The American films were: "Jezebel" (1938),

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"Three Blind Mice" (1938), "The Mad Miss Manton" (1938), "Hurricane" (1937), and "Invitation to Happiness" (1939). Additional American films advertised in this newspaper during May 5-12 were: "Robin Hood" (1938), "Kreutzer Sonata" (1939), "Tell No Tales" (1939), "Forgotten Girls" (1940), "Sanders of the River" (Paul Robeson-1935), "Prisoner of Zenda" (1937), "Count of Monte Cristo" (1934), "Rosalie" (1937), "Hollywood Hotel" (1938), and "Holiday" (1938).

Language. All films of other than French origin shown in Tunisia are dubbed in the French language, with the exception of a very few Egyptian-Arabian films, which, however, must bear French sub-titles.

The native language of about 90 per cent of Tunisians is Arabic. In spite of this fact or the fact that all films are dubbed in French, it may be assumed, since French is the official and business language of the country, that the Italians, Maltese, and Arabs are all to a certain extent familiar with it. Moreover, the Arabic spoken in Tunisia differs from that of Algeria and Morocco; therefore, local operators are of the opinion that the expenses involved in dubbing films with Tunisia-Arabian would not be met by additional box office receipts from the native population.

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In 1928 an official commission was formed to study educational films in the schools throughout Tunisia. A film library at the Direction of Public Instruction and Beaux Arts in Tunis was opened March 13, 1930. These films are mostly of French origin. The film library at Tunis has 32,500 meters of 35 mm. film and 32,000 meters of 9½ mm. film. Fourteen 35 mm. silent projectors are in use in schools throughout Tunisia. No sound projectors are used for these films. All schools in Tunisia are governmental, with the exception of three small Catholic schools. Local Italian schools have been closed since the Italian declaration of war on France, June 10, 1940. No 16 mm. projectors are used.

2. Quality of films shown

(See discussion under Algeria.)

3. Local controls over films shown

Censorship. At the time of latest report (December 10, 1940) the following conditions prevailed: All

films shown in Tunisia have been previously censored by French authorities in Vichy. When the films arrive in Tunis for local exhibition, a detailed written or printed scenario for each film, together with the

certificate delivered by the French authorities in Vichy, is forwarded to the Commissaire of the local

(This note still popular later in 1940. See discussion under Algeria and French Morocco.)

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French Securite Generale in charge of film censorship. In case the local censor decides a revision is necessary, the distributor is advised to this effect. After the revision, a commission of eight members decides whether or not it is acceptable.

During the first ten months of 1940, 486 feature films were censored in Tunisia, of which 183 were rejected as compared with only five during the whole of 1939. Twelve of the 183 rejected films were later approved after revision. Of the definitely rejected films, 101 were of French, 62 of American, 10 of British, 5 of German, 2 of Egyptian, 1 of Italian, 1 of Russian, and 1 of Czechoslovakian origin. No information is available concerning the exact reasons for objection, although it appears probable that the prime consideration was the ridiculing of soldiers or the showing of native troops opposing white troops. Since these films are all pre-censored in Vichy, no censorship agreements have been formulated by the Tunisian government with other countries. At that time American motion pictures were not discriminated against either by a quota system or by other legislation.

4. Audience reactions and preferences

(No specific information, except that United States films were still popular late in 1940. See discussion under Algeria and French Morocco.)

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E. Summary of present propaganda significance of motion pictures in North Africa

1. Domestic production

(None) ~~and all American films in order to leave the~~

2. Axis production

Surprisingly weak in features, very strong in news-reels and other special propaganda shorts. Aim apparently is to make propaganda stimuli more effective by "sugar-coating" them with attractive non-propaganda United States entertainment films. There is no evidence of Italian influence, but much of German.

3. Vichy production

With the ever-increasing control exerted by the Nazi Propaganda Ministry over French film production, through the so-called International Film Chamber, the newly-organized Continental Films, and other channels, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish French from Nazi films. As in the case of the radio and the press, the French cinema industry is being wrought into another propaganda weapon for Axis interest. American films have been virtually eliminated from Occupied France, but are still tolerated in the Unoccupied Zone and in French North Africa.

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showing of old films is not wholly clear, but it is obvious that the ultimate Nazi intention is to eliminate all American films in order to leave the field open for German production.

4. United Nations production

Evidence is not available on the presence of British or Russian films in North Africa.

American films in that area are with few exceptions either relatively innocuous features of pre-war vintage or cartoon films of the Disney type. There is no evidence of new American film imports since 1940, nor of any specifically propagandistic films sent to that area. The American films now showing are evidently popular. In no sense, however, do they represent an antidote to Axis propaganda and may even serve to make it more palatable. The portending elimination of American films from all the areas controlled by Vichy may have at least one positive advantage for the United Nations, since it would leave the film audience at the mercy of Nazi production, the effectiveness of which would backfire through the lack of any comic or other escapist relief. It is hardly to be expected, however, that this one positive factor could compensate for the blow to our prestige which lies in yielding the field to Goebbels, and for the disappearance for our friends among the North African population of the

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best concrete reminder of American ideas and achievements. Radio programs are but a feeble substitute for a good film program.

Furthermore, the Nazi movie producers are far from unskillful; they can produce edifying and entertaining films if they so desire, and they are undoubtedly doing so for just such audiences as that in North Africa. (German films were virtually banned in Turkey until the very successful "Robert Koch" film broke down the barriers by its extremely high qualities and its complete freedom from propaganda in the conventional sense.)

F. Potentialities of American films in psychological warfare strategy in North Africa

American films, because of their long tradition of popularity and their technical and artistic superiority, constitute one of the principal weapons at our disposal in psychological warfare.

1. American films serve North Africans as a pleasant reminder of a people otherwise known to them chiefly through their own Axis-controlled news channels.
2. American films can keep alive respect for our technical and artistic achievements (if carefully selected).
3. American films, if carefully selected, can serve as excellent propaganda for democratic ideas and values. (Cf. the popularity of "Mr. Smith Goes to Washington" in France.)

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4. American newsreels and documentaries cannot only counteract the devastating effect of Axis films but can stimulate French attitudes preparatory to an Allied offensive in North Africa.

G. Difficulties and need for further technical information

All these admirable goals can be achieved, however, only if American films can be shipped to North Africa and actually shown in the theaters of Casablanca, Tangiers, Algeria, Tunis, and other large cities. The technical problems involved in this implementation of American film export policy are not considered in this report.

The next stage of investigation should aim to secure information needed for this technical phase of the problem through State, Commerce, OWI, OSS-SI, and other agencies. This information should aim to cover the following points:

1. Names, addresses, and organizations of United States film companies active or potentially active in the area;
2. Names, addresses, and organizations of non-United States film companies active in the area;
3. Names of local film officials (theater managers, censors, operators, etc.) whose cooperation would be required;
4. Statement of transportation facilities;
5. Outline of whole problem of actually getting current United States films to North Africa and getting them shown there;

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6. Outline of procedures to be followed in translating film export policy, as defined by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, into film export practice, by cooperation (for example) with the Office of Censorship Film Review Boards in Hollywood and New York;

7. Outline for a possible film production policy in conjunction with film exports to North Africa, in collaboration with the film offices of OSS, OWI (Mellott), and OWI (Sherwood), or directly with the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America.

Proposed: Outline for a possible film production policy in conjunction with film exports to North Africa. This will appear in the May 1944 issue of Screen International and will provide an outline for making contacts with the most reliable organizations in the film industry, and possibilities for establishing the best liaison, and maintaining close contact with the government and its various departments. It will specify the communication and exchange of military and economic information and news. The committee will be able to make recommendations to

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XII. SUMMARY ESTIMATE

Although the battle is not yet decided, the Axis must be judged to be ahead of the United Nations in the psychological war for the sympathy of North Africa. The factors which give them their current advantage are numerous, and many cannot easily be overcome. Primary, perhaps, is the fact that the French and Spanish regimes in North Africa with the greatest access to the audience are either half-heartedly or whole heartedly supporting the Axis cause in their propaganda activities. Related to the same fact is the greater access to the audience allowed Germany and Italy -- demonstrated, for example, by the absence of jamming for their radio programs. For the Arab population, the fact that Germany rules over no Arab people makes it possible for her to appear in the role of selfless liberator. The Axis propaganda is also able to exploit long-standing native prejudices, most notably anti-Semitism. To the French audience, and possibly to a less extent to the Moslem audience, the anti-British theme has genuine appeal. In all groups the undeniable military achievements of Germany must create admiration and fear. In general, because of their greater willingness to make promises, Germany and Italy are able to appeal effectively to the major wishes of the important groups involved.

It is the Axis and not the democracies which makes the

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because energetic and explicit, appeals to the Arab desire for freedom would jeopardize the British hold on other Arabic lands and half-hearted or general appeals are rendered unconvincing by this tenure. Moreover, the Axis manages to keep much -- though by no means all -- of the French audience convinced that only through collaboration can they hold what little they have.

The score is not entirely black. The Axis so far has not been able openly to exploit the Moslem resentment against the French. The fact that its promises of freedom for the Arabs have been made explicit for British held areas only has not been missed or left uncriticized by Moslem leaders in North Africa. British news programs have a reputation for reliability, and among some Moslem groups British colonial rule is recognized as much superior to the French or Italian. Among the French deep hatred of Germany and scorn of the Italians is still present.

American propaganda, the newcomer to the field, starts out with a favorable reputation. Of all the nations which might talk of Arabic self-rule, or of reforms in this direction, the United States is the most likely to be believed. Of any armies which might occupy North Africa, the American troops would be best received -- probably by both native and European populations. The problem for American propagandists will be to secure a policy vigorous enough to convince the Moslem population that their aspirations to self-government will be best met through a United Nations' victory. American

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broadcasts will likewise have to placate the anxieties of the French nationals, who in their catastrophe hang on to their Empire as a last source of self-respect.

French officials will now be anxious only for the safety of their own troops and their families, and this situation need be considered as a temporary one. In view of the German's tenacity, the French will not capitulate and the French believe you by your lack of determination to do this, though from a strategical point of view.

French morale

French morale has always believed that the show must go on, although in the division of August 1939 and 1940 was entirely inaccurate to say so. The French will do the same as nothing has changed. Only now it would normally not be willing to do so for other states, especially not the United States or the USSR, because the French would then get their backs cut off and stop being the moderating factor between the United States and the USSR. In addition, the government here at present is just like the USSR, internally and the USSR at international conferences now generalizing that the USSR has been discredited by Germany.

Information re. USSR, Soviet Civil Report, January 1941

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Part I. E. International Situation

North Africa has come under French and Spanish rule only after a long diplomatic struggle during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Many of the past claims have not been forgotten. At the present time Spanish and Italian demands for parts of this area are advanced most frequently. Germany has been relatively reticent in its demands, but this reticence must be considered only a momentary opportunism. France desires to maintain the status quo, while Great Britain and the United States can be considered disinterested in the area, except from a strategical point of view.

Spanish Interests

Spanish imperialists have always believed that the share which Spain obtained in the division of Morocco in 1904 and 1912 was entirely inadequate to satisfy the historic rights and the economic needs of their nation. Any type of Spanish government can be relied upon to advance these claims, especially when the present occupant of the area, France, has been weakened by a military defeat. One step towards the satisfaction of Spanish claims has already been taken in the occupation of the international zone of Tangier in June 1940. Gradually all the forms of international government were removed during 1941 and the town incorporated in Spanish Morocco.¹

¹ Accession No. 1697, Special C.S.C. report, October 17, 1941

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The remaining Spanish claims in North Africa vary. Moderate Spaniards demand at least frontier rectifications. Less moderate Spaniards claim all of northern Morocco. Imperialist Spaniards look forward to a solid block of Spanish territory from Tangier to the present Spanish possessions of Ifni and Rio de Oro.¹ Moreover, Spanish consular officials have been reported to have advised Spanish nationals to remain in the department of Oran, Algeria, in the anticipation of a possible plebiscite.²

Since 1940 the French have been constantly kept on the alert by Spanish troop movements and propaganda campaigns.³ Spanish newspapers in Morocco have been consistently anti-French.⁴ Spanish consular agents have been reported to be organizing 5th columns and stirring up native unrest.⁵ The presence of 140,000 Spanish troops in North Africa indicates

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mpaign.¹ It seems reasonable to assume that no Spanish action is possible without German approval.

Italian Interests

Italian claims for Tunisia were among the main factors contributing to the diplomatic tension before the outbreak of the present war. Italian "grievances" date from 1881, when the French forestalled Italian action as assuming a "protectorate" over Tunisia. Periodically, with every wave of Italian imperialism, the claims for Tunisia were renewed: The connection between ancient Rome and Carthage made Tunisia an Italian province in the 20th century. The presence of 125,000 to 150,000 Italians as opposed to only 75,000 Frenchmen (according to the Italian census) made Italian interests paramount. Moreover, Tunisia, according to the Italian press, was largely developed by Italian labor and capital. The French opposed to these claims the proximity of Algeria to Tunisia, their own census figures of 108,000 Frenchmen to 94,000 Italians, voluminous economic statistics on capital investment, and above all some scathing comparisons between the development of Tunisia under French rule and Libya under Italian rule.

Though the problem of Tunisia was alive in the 1890's and during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, it entered a critical stage since 1935. In that year a temporary

¹ State, Tangier, June 20, 1942.

privileges of nationality, education, and justice over a period of thirty years. It is assumed that in return for this agreement, Laval gave Mussolini a free hand in Ethiopia. After the Munich conference in 1938, however, the issue was raised again by the Italian government and press. A categorical refusal by the Daladier government, followed by a trip to Tunisia by the prime minister, created a temporary stalemate. To the surprise of most people Italy did not obtain the right of occupation at the time of the French armistice in June 1940.

Italian claims for Tunisia, however, are still as strong as ever at the present time. No Italian government can consider a peace satisfactory without the annexation of Tunisia, no matter what compensations can be found in other parts of the Mediterranean. Tunisia is undoubtedly being used at present as a trump card in the diplomatic game between Germany and Vichy France, and its future might depend on the relative contribution of France and Italy to the German war effort.

At present the Italian Consulate and the Italian Armistice Commission are keeping a close watch over the area.¹ Italian nationals are not only organized into Fascist units as a vast 5th column, but laborers are also recruited for work in

¹ State, Algiers, October 30, 1941; July 8, 1942.

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Axis victories are celebrated publicly with flags and parades.² No power seems to be considering the desires of the two and one-half million natives.

The presence of many Italians in the Department of Constantine, Algeria, might possibly lead to the extension of Italian claims to the "natural boundaries" of Tunisia in the west.

German Interests

German interests are both strategical and commercial.

Strategically the North African coast between Tunis and Agadir offers many points of great importance to a power wanting to control the western Mediterranean and the eastern Atlantic. An historical justification of German rights can be fabricated only for Morocco, and there more specifically for the southern territory around Agadir. Morocco was the cause of three great diplomatic crises before the war of 1914.

In this great strife between French and German interests the Germans finally withdrew in 1912 taking part of French Equatorial Africa as their compensation for the Moroccan claims. During the crisis, however, a German gunboat anchored at Agadir, and ever since that time German sentimentality and ambition have invested this town with a special importance.

German commercial interests look towards the vast market offered by 18 million people in North Africa and the

¹ State, Tunis, July 3, 1942.

² State, Tunis, July 1, 1942.

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cobalt, manganese, phosphate, and possibly other metal deposits in this area. German consuls are reported to have already closely investigated the commercial possibilities in their areas;¹ and attempts have been made to capture the local retail trade.² Moreover, the Germans are said to have invested heavily through French middlemen in the mining companies of southern Morocco.³ Some observers believe that all the economic activity of French North Africa is now under German control through the influence exercised by German interests over the Banque de l'Algérie, the note issue bank for Algeria and Tunisia, and the Banque d'Etat de Maroc, which issues currency for Morocco.⁴

A fantastic attempt at closer coordination of Morocco for the furtherance of German interests was reported in January 1942. At that time rumors concerning the economic union of French and Spanish Morocco circulated.⁵ By the dropping of custom barriers trade between the two countries was to be facilitated, and Tangier, more convenient for shipments to Europe through the Mediterranean, was to replace Casablanca

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as the main Moroccan port.¹ Since such a policy would run absolutely counter to French interests, it seemed obvious that in the present world situation the plan was premature to say the least.

If the Germans choose to follow their usual policy of declaring the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles null and void, claims will be advanced before long for the rights of extra-territoriality² and for restoration of the Mannesmann Company rights in the Sous valley. Among more legally-minded people the latter claim would be null and void since the Mannesmann Company received four million Marks for its interests from the German government.³

French Interests

France before the present war and especially after the defeat of 1940 must be considered a state in favor of the status quo in North Africa. Controlling all of the area, except Spanish Morocco, France at the present thinks mainly of maintaining its position.

Under less adverse circumstances it is likely that Frenchmen might want to remove the "anachronism" of Spanish Morocco and the enclave of Ifni. To support these claims the

¹ O.S.S. Accession No. 15,355, Tangier, March 4, 1942.

² State, Tangier, April 18, 1942.

³ O.S.S. Accession No. 18,369, Casablanca, June 3, 1942.

⁴ O.S.S. Accession No. 18,370, Tangier, June 11, 1942.

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French would assert that the Spaniards were able to establish themselves in these two territories only with French help during the Rif war in 1925 and with the pacification of southern Morocco in the 1930's. Since that time both areas have become centers for anti-French propaganda, a refuge for political leaders escaped from French prisons, and the center of smuggling activities. Claims might also be advanced for the unity of Morocco under the Sultan. Such a French policy, however, is impossible in the present world situation.

To the Frenchmen North Africa is more than a distant colony. It is a "New France", a few hours from southern France, conquered after a century-long struggle at the cost of many French lives and with the expenditure of vast sums of money. The loss of this area might assume an importance in French psychology similar to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine after 1871.

British Interests

Great Britain, like the United States, is generally considered to have no territorial ambitions in North Africa. British interests in the past were mainly commercial and in time of crisis aimed at preventing an unfriendly power from obtaining a coastal foothold which might increase the danger to the British "life line" through the Mediterranean. This policy has probably not changed at the present time. Natives in Morocco are reported to welcome British interference.¹

¹ O.S.S. Accession No. 18,300, Tangier, June 11, 1942.

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The anti-British French press, however, constantly emphasizes the insatiable appetite of British imperialism.

United States Interests

The United States is one of the few powers which is considered disinterested in North Africa. In fact many North Africans are hoping that the United States will increase its economic and political activity - but everyone according to his hopes. To many natives greater American interest means the end of French and Spanish rule and national independence.¹ To many anti-Axis Frenchmen it means the removal of the German threat and a continuation of French domination. To most of the Jews it means the liberation from present oppression.²

Actual American interests, except those connected with war strategy, are small. They consist of rights enjoyed with other powers in the former international zone of Tangier, of commercial relations, and of capital investments. Since the outbreak of the war trade between North Africa and the United States has been very small; most of the investments have been liquidated, and the number of American citizens in North Africa has been reduced drastically.³ In Morocco, for

¹ O.S.S. Accession No. 8,616 (Spanish Intelligence), no date.

² O.S.S. Accession No. 11,130, February 2, 1942.

³ O.S.S. Accession No. 18,273, Casablanca, May 12, 1942.

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example, the United States is protecting the following:
60 citizens, including the consular personnel; 31 United
States nationals theoretically not entitled to protection;
and 40 Moroccan "proteges." Trade in 1941 amounted to 120
million francs for United States exports and 43 million
francs for United States imports. Only two United States
companies are still active in Morocco.¹

United States 25,776
France 25,200
Spanish subjects 18,140
Algeria 10,277
Portugal 10,000
Other countries 10,000
Total 89,193
of these, United States 25,776, not under
consular protection, although in civil cases.

In addition, a considerable but undetermined
number of millions of non-French citizens in North
Africa are protected persons, most of them
residents in towns and cities, who, like citizens
not here, are not entitled under the law of
international law to consular protection. In
general, these persons in Africa are
nationalized citizens or citizens of
Spanish origin. There are 100,000, 120,000 to
the upper figure, citizens reported for this group.²

¹ O.S.S. Accession No. 18,273, Casablanca, May 12, 1942.

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III. PRINCIPAL SOCIAL GROUPS

A. Europeans

2. Spanish

a. Place in the total population. Spanish citizens resident in North Africa are estimated to number about 225,000, distributed as follows:

| | Total Spaniards | Grand Europeans | Total (1936) |
|-----------------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| Spanish Morocco | 100,000 ¹ | 66,379 | 855,297 |
| Tangier | 9,000 ¹ | 25,000 or more | 65,000 or more |
| French Morocco | 23,494 ¹ | 206,506 | 6,296,136 |
| Algeria | 92,377 ² | 883,107 | 7,234,684 |
| Tunisia | 323 ² | 213,205 | 2,603,513 |

of these, nearly one-half (109,000) are under actual Spanish military or civil control.

In addition, a considerable but unknown percentage of the million or more French citizens in North Africa are naturalized Spaniards, many of them colonists in Morocco and Algeria, who, like Italian settlers, sought protection under the regime of Marshal Lyautey. For example, in Algeria the naturalized French citizens included 28,000 of Spanish origin (census of 1931), in addition to

the 110,000 Spanish residents reported for that year.³

1 Current estimate from Legislative Reference Service

2 Official French census, 1936

3 Geographie Universelle, Tome XI, p. 109

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The above figures do not include the military. In January, 1941, there were 150,000 men under arms in Spanish Morocco and about 4,000 in Tangier, half of the latter being Moorish infantry and the rest metropolitan troops.

Persons of Spanish descent are therefore second only to the French in North Africa's European population.

According to the census of 1936, the 115,000 Spaniards were outnumbered by the 125,000 Italians, and far outnumbered by the one million French citizens, but apparently the number of Spaniards has nearly doubled.

Refugees from Europe since 1938, including Spanish loyalists, Jews, and others, have added an estimated one million to the total population of North Africa (bringing it up to nearly 19,000,000), yet even a generous estimate of the Spanish population would indicate that it forms only about one per cent of the grand total.

b. Pertinent historical background. The Moroccan coast has been the scene of Spanish military efforts against "los Moros" for hundreds of years, and some Spanish "presidios" (fortified garrisons, as well as prisons) were in existence over four hundred years ago, notably Ceuta, Alhucemas, and Melilla. After 1830, under French protection, Spanish emigrant peasants carried the Roman technique of dry-farming for grains back into western Algeria. But colonization under Spanish

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auspices has never been extensive or successful; there was practically none in Spanish Morocco prior to 1927, and in 1930 only 21,193 hectares were either cultivated or owned by Spaniards.

This situation probably reflects the nature of Spanish society in Spain. Most of the emigrants to North Africa seem to have been poverty-stricken laborers and peasants, some of whom, virtual refugees, engaged in agriculture, mining, handicrafts, etc., and remained, while others merely went abroad to work a few years and return home. The middle classes in Spain, traditionally in a weak position and, due to delayed industrial advance, weak numerically even today, never seem to have provided many candidates for colonization projects.

Dominated by the conquistadorial tradition, allied with the Church and upper classes, and powerful in Spanish politics, the army has probably had more to do with determining the character of Spanish colonization attempts in North Africa than any other group. The composition of the Spanish army, even after 1898, was like that of the French military establishment of the 18th century. In 1909, the Spanish army had 11,700 officers for its 80,000 men, a ratio of one to seven (contrast the French ratio of one to nineteen for the same period!).

1. Cf. Frank G. Carpenter, "Colonialism in Africa", *World War II*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1942, pp. 10-11.
2. Cf. Frank G. Carpenter, "Barbary and Africa", *World War II*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1942, pp. 12-13.

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Even though class barriers were relaxed and the veteran of Moroccan wars could and did rise from the ranks, he was very likely to go over to the reactionary aristocratic lack of sympathy for the lower classes and scorn for the middle classes. General Sanjurjo, for instance, was of peasant origin, but was prevented from leading the 1936 army rebellion only by his death in an airplane crash en route from Portugal.¹ Even had there been numerous middle-class Spanish entrepreneurs anxious to extend "the European conception of colonization" in a Spanish North Africa, such political leadership might well have discouraged them.

Whatever may develop in North Africa in the future, during the age of steam transportation Spain's interest in Morocco was geographically and historically under-

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Spanish Morocco is, and always has been, a liability rather than an asset to Spain. Until the French helped Spain to end the Riffian campaign, the conquest of Spanish Morocco had cost Spain 800 million dollars in 18 years and a sacrifice of some 13,000 men annually for ten years. Almost every essential commodity must be imported in some quantity, and the only significant export is iron ore (a fine haematite extracted from the Minas del Riff near Melilla to the extent of 250,000 tons per annum in normal times). The Zone is therefore almost entirely dependent upon the expenditures of the army.

In war time Tangier, too, suffers, for its foreign residents, who live on money from home, diminish rapidly, and its income as a seaport is similarly cut down.

c. Important social groups and classes. The important groups among the Spaniards in North Africa which must be taken into consideration include: the Catholics (almost all Spaniards), the civilian settlers and immigrants, the political refugees, the high army officers, the lower army officers and men, the bureaucrats of Tetuan and other government officials, the Falangists.

Evidently the Spanish in North Africa are largely urban dwellers. An Italian source (*Encyclopedie Italiana; articles on cities*), which should have

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no reason to exaggerate, estimates the total number of Spanish residents in the following important cities at 152,000:

| | Total Spaniards | Total Europeans | Total Population (1936) |
|-----------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|
| Algiers | (1926) 16,000 | 175,694 | 252,321 |
| Oran | (1931) 29,000 | 148,562 | 194,746 |
| Marrakech | (1931) 1,000 | 7,112 | 100,577 |
| Tangier | (1937) 10,000 | 17,000 | 62,000 |
| Tetuan | (1935) 11,500 | 13,000 | 49,000 |
| Ceuta | (1931) 25,000 | (Not available) | 50,000 |
| Melilla | (1934) 60,000 | (Not available) | 64,000 |

No statistics regarding occupational groups are at hand. Probably most of the Spanish civilians are laborers, small agriculturalists and small business men, with a few prosperous landowners, mine owners, and managers; but there is a paucity of information about such Spanish "men in the street." Aries included characteristic of the Spanish Zone is the system of settlements called "Grande Colonizacion", in which each unit or "large colonization center" is constituted of groups of dwellings on large tracts where the owners or managers and the workers live. The best of these have shops, flour mills, electric power facilities, garages, stables, as well as infirmaries, schools, and a small chapel for the Spaniards and one for the Molems.

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Another pattern of settlement is called the "medium colony" or "isolated farms." These represent the collective efforts of several families, who have invested capital in the enterprise and thus eliminated the landlord. There are (1930) more than one thousand of these in the Zone, each usually consisting of a large house, smaller habitations for the laborers, granaries, and outbuildings.

There also is a "small colonization plan" for dividing government tracts into small lots for peasant proprietors successful in bidding appropriate tax rates for the use of the land. In 1930 this plan was still experimental, and while no information is at hand regarding its extension since then, it seems at least doubtful that Franco's Spain would have encouraged much development in this direction.

Spanish loyalists who fled to North Africa included professional men as well as artisans and laborers, and they, with other refugees from Europe since 1939, are reported to have almost doubled the city populations of Morocco. Little appears to be known of their numbers or present economic position. Some had joined the French Foreign Légion and were later impressed into labor battalions, including eight hundred Spaniards forced to labor on the Trans-Saharan Railroad (Fall 1941). While these refugees have doubtless

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increased the proportion of Spaniards of middle-class origin, we have no information regarding their present positions or influence, except for random and sometimes dubious reports, such as one to the effect that the Casablanca police have arrested numerous Spanish political refugees charged with creating a "communist organization." Spain under Franco has increased the military establishment to over 150,000, as well as the number of officials in Spanish Morocco and the number of consuls and secret agents elsewhere in North Africa.

In reports at hand, occasional references to the official and semi-official activities of Spaniards in North Africa indicate that the civil and military officials, at least, are under Falangist control.

The Spanish "Nazis" are apparently organized wherever Spaniards are sufficiently numerous and willing to form a local of the Falange. In Oran, for example, the Spanish Consul is reported to have issued instructions to the Falange and the Auxilio Social on procedures to be followed in the event of either an Anglo-American attack or a German "coup de force."

The same report says that the Consul in Oran has advised Spaniards to remain there in order to serve their country in the event of a plebiscite or in case of military developments. Indeed, Spanish consulates are even attempting to rally Jews of Spanish origin.

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What the Falange would probably like to do elsewhere in North Africa is indicated in a report on Tangier early in 1942. Here it "has become all-powerful; its membership card is the only means of admittance to municipal jobs, state contracts, licenses of any kind" and "at the same time all but everything is made subject to some variety of license." In order to keep the Spanish "poor whites" in line, the Falange in Tangier is said to offer "two free meals daily to the children... if not, however, without checking up first on the general political habits of the parents."¹

In short, present information suggests that the important social groups and classes among the Spaniards of North Africa have probably become, since the Civil War, somewhat more representative of the home population.

d. Situations in which attitudes and opinions are formed.

There are no descriptions at hand regarding the social situations in which North African Spaniards form attitudes about public affairs, but it seems highly probable that they differ little from other Europeans of the same social classes. In the cities, for example, Spanish laborers would have about the same opportunities to arrive at their opinions as the French or Italian ones would. These three principal European nationalities, incidentally, are all predominantly Catholic, and therefore are more or less acquainted with whatever position the Church may take from time to time in regard to public affairs.

¹ Colwyn Becket, "Liberty Comes to Tangier", in World Review, pp. 24-28, February 1942)

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As noted above, over half of the ~~Spaniards~~ in North Africa live in cities, almost all are quite poor, and the vast majority of them generally are concentrated in northwestern Algeria and northern Morocco. Consequently, they form a compact ethnic group and language community, and even without much access to mass communications (due to poverty or to Falangist bans), news, rumor, and new opinions must spread quite rapidly among them.

e. Ideologies and religious beliefs. If it is true that North Africa now has a Spanish population more representative of the homeland than every before, then an extraordinary variety and range of political ideologies must be currently professed or secretly nurtured by the Spaniards in this area. All the minuscule groups and hair-splitting programs that entered into the life of Republic Spain are conceivably represented.

Recent reports have given greatest prominence to the aspirations and activities of the Falangists, who are possibly more firmly in the saddle south of the Straits than in Madrid. Their greatest long-range ambition is reported to be "the union not only of Portugal, Gibraltar, and Morocco with Spain as a great Ibero-African dominion" but even the reconquesta

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of Latin America, the Caribbean, and, perhaps, the Philippines. This new empire would direct its efforts against "the Anglo-Saxon spirit of liberalism, Protestantism, and commercialism" and would revivify the ideas and ideals of the 16th century.¹ More practically, perhaps, Falangist posters not long ago proclaimed, "So that Spain may be great -- Gibraltar, Tangier, Casablanca, Fez, Oran, Algiers." The Falangist oath for youth stresses "the material and spiritual conquest of our lost Empire."

In actual fact, Franco's Spain has thus far done little more than decree the incorporation of Tangier in Spanish Morocco (January 1, 1941), but even this has apparently been so moderately carried out that by no means all forms of international cooperation have been removed.

It appears that almost any Spanish government can be depended upon to advance something in the nature of an imperialist or expansionist ideology, so the Falangists are by no means unique in aspiring to achievements beyond Spain's strength.

The most deeply-rooted ideology among Spaniards is probably that of the Catholic Church, which in the political sphere is traditionally linked with support of the monarchy. Of an apparently great

¹ Hans Kohn, "Spanish Imperialism: A Dream Resumed" in American Scholar, vol. 18, no. 3, 1939, pp. 321-332

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number of possibilities, a combination of monarchists and army officers opposed to the political aims of some Falangists (especially Serrano Suñer) might well come to power when the defeat of Germany appears more inevitable to the Spaniards. Reports at hand do not indicate that republican or democratic ideologies, as such, have any strongly organized followers at present in North Africa's Spanish population.

f. Basic social attitudes. There is no information at hand as to what the Spanish "man in the street" in North Africa thinks about the natives and other ethnic groups among his neighbors or about the various nations currently interested in his part of the world.

The Spanish have always been envious of the French for their colonial achievements in North Africa and were annoyed by the fact that Primo de Rivera was obliged to call in French aid to defeat Abd-el-Krim.

In 1941 the Spanish were apparently cooperating with the Germans more whole-heartedly than they have lately. Recent reports suggest that the Spanish are more anxious to keep on friendly or at least neutral terms with Great Britain and the United States. When a British plane was fired on by Spanish anti-aircraft guns near Cape Malabata while convoying a passenger ship, it was apparent to British observers that the shots were merely warning shots.

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The resumption of trade between the United States and French North Africa early in August, the "brisk trade" between the United States and neutral Spain, Franco's new order to the Spanish press to publish United States communique, and President Roosevelt's encouragement of a Latin American-United States movement to "help Spain save its culture" -- all forecast ultimate Spanish adherence to the side with the strongest legions. ~~population may not be the determining factor~~
Even though, as Catholics, many Spaniards may be antagonistic toward Russia as "bolshevistic" and "irreligious", once they realize Russia's importance in the ultimate defeat of the Axis (and hence importance at the peace table), they will probably not take long to discover the U.S.S.R. to be another "Holy Russia."

All Spaniards are, to some extent, what they are because their nation has not only had its day of glory, but has also descended to the status of a nation which runs from one international conference table to another, begging crumbs from greater Powers. Interwoven with many Spanish attitudes is the folk lore of what it means to be defeated, as well as what it means to dominate. In the future, further industrialization in Spain may increase the influence of the middle classes to ameliorate that hangover of

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the 16th century, the sharp, cruel division of Spanish society into rulers and oppressed. Inasmuch as the Spaniards in Morocco enthusiastically nurtured the latest manifestation of this tradition by aiding the 1930 army rebellion, it may be too much to expect a Spanish liberal renascence to begin in North Africa, but one wonders what the loyalist refugees are doing there and whether the increase of middle-class Spaniards in the population may not be the forerunner of a movement to bring freedom back to Spain.

| | In millions | Frenchmen | Total Population |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|-----------|------------------|
| Spanish Morocco and Tangier | no figures given | " | " |
| Tunish Morocco | 35,644 | 257,000 | 6,296,000 |
| Algeria | 10,000 | 303,000 | 7,735,000 |
| Tunisia | 94,207 | 223,000 | 3,636,000 |

The relative sizes of the French and Italian populations in Tunisia have been the subject of seriousious discussion between Italian and French writers for many years. Thus, for the year 1936, Italian sources quote the Italian population of Tunisia as being of the order of 11,000;

¹Data for 1936 from Legislative Reference Service.

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PART ONE

II. PRINCIPAL SOCIAL GROUPS

A. Europeans

3. Italians

a. Place in the total population. The Italians form the third most numerous European element in North Africa. The heaviest concentration of Italians obtains in Tunisia, but as the following table shows, they are to be found in French Morocco and Algeria as well.

Italians in North Africa¹

| | Total Population | Europeans | Italians |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|-----------|------------------|
| Spanish Morocco and Tangier | --- | --- | no figures given |
| French Morocco | 6,296,000 | 207,000 | 15,654 |
| Algeria | 7,235,000 | 383,000 | 21,009 |
| Tunisia | 2,608,000 | 213,000 | 94,289 |

The relative sizes of the French and Italian populations in Tunisia have been the subject of acrimonious discussion between Italian and French writers for many years. Thus, for the year 1906, Italian sources quote the Italian population of Tunisia as being of the order of 81,000,

¹ Data for 1936 from Legislative Reference Service.

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whereas French sources give, on the basis of census figures, an estimate of the order of 34,000. Such a source as the Enciclopedia Italiana admits, however, that the French population in Tunisia has been slightly larger than the Italian since 1931.

b. Pertinent historical background

As early as 1873 the Italian Commission on Emigration reported Italians to be living in Algeria and Tunisia. The emigrants to northern Africa of that period are described as a predominantly commercial element. Beginning in 1880, there was a tremendous influx of Italian emigrants, especially in Tunisia. This new wave of immigrants consisted chiefly of laborers, plus a few herdsmen and fishermen, and coincided with the accelerated expansion of public works, such as roads, railways, ports and fortifications, instituted by the French government.

By 1890, since the demand for workers in construction enterprises was steadily diminishing, the vocational character of the Italian emigrants was undergoing a change in the direction of an increasing number of agriculturalists. This increase in the size of the agricultural element coincides with the increased efforts at rural

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cultivation which were taking place in Tunisia and Algeria at the time. Not only were there more agriculturalists coming into the country, but those who had come in as common laborers ten years before were turning their hand to agriculture.

The 1931 census showed approximately one-third (37,000) of the Italians in Tunisia to be Italian born, of which 32,000 were Sicilians. A breakdown of the data for 1901 (Tunisia) provides a picture of the regional and vocational origin of the earlier Italian immigrants.

Workers
Origin and Vocation of Italians in Tunisia¹

| | |
|----------------|--|
| Sicilians | 58,000 (laborers and agriculturalists) |
| Southern Italy | 4,000 (chiefly fishermen) |
| Central Italy | 13,000 (Tuscan Jews; merchants, bankers, industrialists; also non-Jewish servants) |
| Northern Italy | 2,000 (merchants and miners) |
| Sardinians | 3,000 (miners) |

c. Important social groups and classes.

The Italian population today in North Africa is made up predominantly of laboring and

¹Commissariato dell' Emigrazione, "Emigrazione e Colonie," 1906

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agricultural elements. In the order of diminishing importance the three most numerous classes are: laboring, agricultural, commercial. The table which follows is based on the 1921 census in Tunisia and served to indicate the distribution of vocations among the French and Italian population.

Vocational Distribution in Tunisia¹

| | French | Italians |
|-----------------------------------|--------|----------|
| Agriculturalists | 12% | 16% |
| MERCHANTS | 15% | 11% |
| Transportation | 8% | 5% |
| Professional | 4% | 1% |
| Workers | — | 55% |
| Civil servants and police | 27% | .3% |
| Living from rents and investments | 3% | 1% |
| Unclassified | 19% | 10% |

While this breakdown is based on data gathered some twenty years ago, it is nevertheless significant, since it is unlikely that with the exception of the professional and civil servant classes, any radical shifts in this classification have occurred. It will be seen that over half the Italians in Tunisia are common laborers, and that

¹Tunidei, C., La question Tunisiana e l'Italia. 1922

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more of the agriculture and viticulture is done by the Italians than by the French. There is, however, a perceptible number of Italians who live on their investments. The data do not give specific evidence on this point, but the history of Italian emigration to Tunisia, together with the nature of that country's economy permits us to conjecture that these persons constitute a small nucleus of Italian bourgeoisie who have made their money in commerce and large-scale land holding.

As is true of other European groups, the Italian population is largely urban in character. Three-fifths of the Italians are city dwellers. Their distribution by city is as follows (latest available figures):

| <u>Italians living in North African Cities</u> | | | |
|--|--------------|---------------------|------------------|
| | No. Italians | European Population | Total Population |
| French Morocco | | | |
| Casablanca (1926) | 8,000 | 34,984 | 106,608 |
| Rabat (1931) | 1,000 | 20,000 | 53,106 |
| Algeria | | | |
| Algiers (1926) | 6,000 | 159,649 | 214,920 |
| Philippeville (1931) | 3,000 | 23,000 | 47,750 |
| Boné (1931) | 10,000 | 31,000 | 52,000 |
| Tunisia | | | |
| Tunis (1926) | 44,000 | 87,205 | (1931) 202,405 |
| Bizerte " | 2,500 | 6,738 | 21,000 |
| Scusse " | 2,400 | 4,300 (1931) | 25,300 |
| Sfax " | 2,500 | 10,000 (1931) | 40,000 |
| Ferryville" | 1,000 | --- | --- |
| Total | 80,400 | | |

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Presumably the remaining two-fifths are farmers or agricultural laborers. The data on land holdings indicate that few of them are proprietors.

So far as commerce is concerned, one item taken from the 1911 census indicates a total of 4,819 Italian employers in Tunisia, with their employees totaling 23,000 persons.

In addition to the laboring, agricultural, and commercial group, there is one which, while numerically small, is of great importance and influence at the present time. This is the compact group of teachers and journalists. In the present situation their attitudes and sympathies can be safely described as being "official." They are discussed further in d. below.

Still another group which is even smaller than that of the teachers, but at present very powerful, is the Commission which was created by the terms of the 1940 Armistice. This body, in addition to its official duties, undoubtedly functions as a nucleus for propaganda and espionage. The number of persons constituting this group is not definitely known, but one observer surmises it to be the order of 100-200.

1. ¹See also the creation of a general firm edition,

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d. Situations in which attitudes and opinions are formed.

At least five sources of opinion-formation may be distinguished among the Italians in North Africa and in Tunisia.

(1) Schools. In the early days the percentage of illiteracy among Italians in North Africa was very high. Data for Tunisia gathered by the Italian Consul there in 1930 showed that from 40 to 50 per cent of the Italian adults in Tunisia were illiterate. However, there has been a very rapid growth in the number of educational institutions in the last twenty to forty years.

The situation changed rather sharply following the Laval treaty in 1935. The number of children in the subsidized royal schools rose from three thousand to nearly fifteen thousand. Uniforms were given to them, motor cars collected them from the remoter villages, canteens were established for their use, and they were drilled in the Fascist Balilla.¹ This is the easily recognized pattern of Fascist regimentation and indoctrination. The continuation of such a regimen for a period of years would inevitably result in the creation of a powerful fifth column.

¹ Brailsford, H.N. "The Blackshirts in Tunisia." New Rep. vol. 98, 1939.

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The Laval treaty was cancelled in 1939, however, and undoubtedly the French have taken definite measures to put an end to this unconcealed Fascist infiltration. It has not been possible to determine the nature of the situation which has obtained since the fall of France.

(2) Organizations. There have been a number of social and patriotic organizations in Tunisia since the turn of the century, and this number has increased in recent years. In 1900, nine such organizations are listed in Tunis alone:¹

1. Mutual Social Welfare Society
2. Mutual Help Society of Italian Workers
3. Tunisian Branch of the "Dante Alighieri"
4. Garibaldini Society
5. Gruppo Garibaldino
6. Society of Furloughed Soldiers
7. Juvenes Carthaginis
8. The Sports Society
9. Star of Italy

Between 1921 and 1928 at least three new groups were formed: 1) the Savoia, 2) the Italian Circle, and 3) Italica Gens.

Although there is no definite evidence to that effect, many data would force one to surmise that many of these organizations have been utilized since the advent of Fascism for

¹ Commissariato dell'Emigrazione. Ibid.

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the dissemination of Fascist propaganda. Those most likely to be involved would be the ~~Bento~~ Alighieri, the Society of Furloughed Soldiers, the Sports Society, the Savoia, the Star of Italy, the Italian Circle, and Italica Gens.

(3) Fascist units. Even before 1930 Fascist organizations had been founded in North Africa, principally in Tunisia -- economic and political groups, Fascist meeting halls, theaters, sport groups, etc. These organizations take in a large majority of the young people and are sponsored by the Fascist Party working through the consular agencies. From 1935 to 1939 Tunis very frequently witnessed processions of Blackshirt Militia on the streets. Beginning 1935, the political police, known as the OVRA, made itself felt also. The Italian workers were withdrawn from the French syndicates (labor unions) and organized by the Dopolavoro (the Afterwork organization). The buildings of the Tunis Consulate are daily thronged by indigent and unemployed Italian workers who receive relief through its funds. There were in 1939, some 9,000 of these.¹

(4) Newspapers and government sponsored lectures. There is at least one large and influential Italian newspaper in French North Africa. This is called

¹Brailsford, H. N., *Ibid.*, p. 32.

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"L'Unione," is published in Tunis, and in 1925 built a very large and handsome structure wherein it is now housed. The "Unione" is a militant daily which carries on a violent polemic against the French administration.

"The Italian government keeps a steady stream of journalists, professors, deputies and lecturers flowing from Italy to Italian centers in Tunisia."¹ This sentence, from a writer who is one of the protagonists on the Italian side of the Tunisian question, gives us a vivid glimpse of the efforts of the Fascist regime to indoctrinate the Italian nationals in Tunisia. The fact that the Italian government has availed itself of every possible channel of communication for this purpose has elicited frequent complaints from French officials and from the French press.

e. Ideologies and religious beliefs

It may be said that the majority of Italians in North Africa are sympathetic to Fascism if they are not actual members of the Fascist Party. In the mind of the average Italian, Fascism means, in the first place, an accentuated patriotism -- that is, love and devotion to the fatherland. In addition, Fascism emphasizes the importance and dignity of the family and the

¹Bonura, Francesco, *Ibid.*, p. 32.

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(Catholic) Church. The Fascist ideology, furthermore, is certainly not hostile to private enterprise and the accumulation of property. The structure of Fascism was fashioned, in fact, to embody these elements in Italian popular thought. At the same time it purports, by the machinery of state control, to prevent the abuses attendant upon the unlimited accumulation of wealth and power in private hands. The fact that the majority of Italians in French North Africa are peasant workers, or at best small property owners, together with the all-pervasive Fascist propaganda to which they have been subjected since Mussolini's coming to power, cannot but put most of them in rapproche with the Fascist ideology.

It is difficult to estimate the number of Italian Socialists who are to be found among the Italian citizens residing in the French North African empire. Such individuals were, prior to the coming of Fascism, members of the various Socialist groups existing in Italy at the time and were purged by Mussolini's Blackshirts. They represent varying degrees of radical political opinion, ranging all the way from outright anarchism to a relatively mild liberalism of the social-democratic type. It is known that many of these went to other countries in Europe and to

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North America in the years immediately following the advent of Fascism in Italy, and it is not unlikely that some went to French North Africa. A certain number have perhaps become naturalized French citizens, but there are no data on this point.

On the whole, it is most unlikely that any perceptible number of Italians in the region in question have much comprehension or sympathy for the principles of liberal-democratic government as we understand them in the United States.

The Italian population in North Africa is overwhelmingly Catholic. Using data collected in 1901, one writer makes the following breakdown of the religious denominations among the Italians in Tunisia:

Religious Denominations among Italians

in Tunisia¹

| | |
|-------------|--------|
| Catholics | 65,280 |
| Israelites | 14,500 |
| Protestants | 200 |
| | 79,980 |

The attitude of the Catholic Church in North Africa toward Fascism is not clear. In Italy itself, the Vatican paper has been judged by some observers² to be veering in recent months to a position more

¹Commissariato dell'Emigrazione, *Ibid.*

²Buxton Report, No. 781, 6-30-42.

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In a given region, local or national, favorable to the Italian Government; this, of course, does not guarantee that the Catholic officials in Tunis, for instance, will take exactly the same line. In any case, the Church would wield considerable influence on the faithful, particularly the feminine element, and is a factor to be reckoned with. It should be said that relations between the Vatican and the Fascist Government have not always been completely cordial, and there have been, from time to time, overt disagreements over the matter of the instruction of school children. This is exemplified by the clash in Rome some ten years ago between the Catholic organization, the Azione Cattolica (Catholic Action), and the Fascist Party.

f. Basic social attitudes

Direct evidence is lacking as to what social attitudes and convictions characterize the Italians in North Africa. Some fairly valid inferences can be made, however.

The majority of the Italians in Algeria and Tunisia are ordinary laborers and agriculturalists, whose class standing is not very high. From the evidence available on Italian immigrants in North America, the situation which would develop in such circumstances can be conjectured. The indigenous members of the population

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in a given region tend to assume an attitude of condescension or outright disdain toward the foreigner who gives evidence of poverty. The Italians who came to North Africa were mostly Sicilians and at the time of their arrival undoubtedly quite destitute. It is not difficult to imagine their developing inferiority feelings under these conditions.

The campaign of the Fascist Regime to make of Italy a first-class power by diplomatic and military means must have given these people a great psychological "lift." They would feel that Mussolini had made Italians feared and respected throughout the world. If the evidence among Italians in the United States is indicative, there can be no doubt that the majority of the lowlier elements in the Tunisian and Algerian population is pro-Fascist by virtue of this fact.

The successful termination of the Ethiopian campaign would serve to emphasize their loyalties. Possibly the results of Italy's participation in the war has cut into this loyalty, but the fundamental basis for a feeling of gratitude to Mussolini exists.

This psychology may not prevail, at least not to the same degree, among the Italians in North Africa who "have made good." It is interesting in this connection to consider some data on the naturalization of Italians to French citizenship. In 1925, 440 heads

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of families became naturalized French citizens in Tunisia. Of these, 178 were small merchants or urban industrialists, 135 were salaried employees working on railroads and trams, 99 were laborers, 18 were agriculturalists, 3 were fishermen, and 2 were miners.¹ Extrapolating from this list, one is tempted to say that willingness to assume French citizenship stands in direct ratio to economic status. It may very well be, however, that this apparent connection merely reflects the fact that persons in higher economic positions were more susceptible to the pressure which the French government has exercised in this direction. Among railroad and tram employees, for instance, according to Bonura's evidence, French citizens were given preferred status over Italian citizens.

The attitude of the wealthier elements among the Italian population toward Fascism is unknown. The attitude which a given capitalist will take depends on his particular circumstances. If his business has been plagued by labor troubles, he is much more likely to be sympathetic to Fascist doctrine. On the other hand, the inevitable bureaucratic controls attendant upon centralized organizations are likely to prove troublesome later on. Thus it happens frequently that capitalists do not take enthusiastically to the

¹ Bonura, Francesco, *Ibid.*

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idea of having some distant government agency tell them how many persons they shall employ and what wages they shall pay.¹

There is an element in the Italian colony which has not as yet been considered, namely, the Jewish banking and mercantile group. It will be recalled from section b, above, that a large number of Italians coming from central Italy belonged to this class. More recent observers attest to the size and influence of this relatively opulent group.² It is clear that the events in Axis Europe, and the discrimination against the Jews in Italy in particular which has been instituted at Hitler's request, cannot but tend to alienate the sympathies of these people from the Fascist Government. This group undoubtedly contains the highest percentage of sympathizers to the cause of the United Nations.

It has not been possible to obtain direct data on the attitude of the Italian element in North Africa to the French there. We do have data from Tunisia which indicate that the French citizens are systematically placed at an advantage with respect

¹Personal conversations with two Italian capitalists.

²Brailsford, H. W., *Ibid.*

Brailsford, H. W., *Ibid.*

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to the Italians as regards positions in state-controlled enterprises. Thus in the railway and tram systems, the amount of training required of workers who are French citizens is less than that required of Italians; the pay for the former is higher, as are benefits.¹ Furthermore, Italians are not eligible for any public posts, however modest; it is probably true, as they complain, that their firms receive no contracts from the Government. They have, of course, no representation, as their French neighbors do on the Grand Council that serves as a sort of legislature.² In view of these facts, and the additional circumstance that, in general, the economic status of the body of French citizens is superior to that of the Italians, the relations between these two European elements are not likely to be of the best.

It has been frequently asserted that the European population in North Africa is predominantly anti-Russian in its attitudes. To what extent the Italian element shares in this antagonism is not known on the basis of actual data. It is not likely, however, that the Italians should differ in this respect. The Italian element in the United States, for instance, was by and

¹ Bonura, Francesco, *Ibid.*

² Brailsford, H. N., *Ibid.*

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large, if only by virtue of its being Catholic, definitely anti-Bolshevik even before the war. There is no reason to believe that the situation is essentially different in North Africa.

It would be desirable to know the attitude of the Italian members of the Armistice Commission toward their German colleagues, and even more, the attitude of North African Italians toward the Germans in general. On neither of these points has it been possible to obtain any definite evidence. One observer reports that during the period of the Italian defeats in Greece and North Africa the Italian members of the Commission were seldom seen in public. It is well known, of course, that social relations between the German and Italian elements of the Axis armed forces in Libya and Italy are on the whole bad. It would not be too far-fetched to suppose that the German and Italian members of the Commission are not particularly cordial in their attitudes toward each other. This, however, is only conjecture.

Since from the 1850's the traditional foe of Italians has been "the German," it may be conjectured that, on the whole, the attitude of Italians in North Africa toward Germans is not very different from that which is reported in the Italian peninsula.

Pearl Harbor

4. Germans

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There are very few, if any, Germans in North Africa except those who are there on official business. These consist of Consular staffs, which are said to be large, of the Armistice Commission said to number several hundreds, and of various other special missions. One report asserts that the French have been forced to issue 6,000 Sauf Conduits to Germans who circulate in the area, carrying French papers and speaking perfect French.

The Germans are thus present in the total population in infinitesimal numbers and are there to perform specific missions calculated to further the German war effort. They are supported by the Reich, are organized on a military or semi-military basis, and may be presumed to be fairly loyal Nazis with the social attitudes that implies. Most of them probably live in the larger cities, but many it is reported circulate in the rural and tribal areas.

5. British and Americans

The position of the British and Americans in North Africa is very similar to that of the Germans, except that they get very little cooperation from the French while the Germans get much and that their ideologies and loyalty are oriented in United Nations rather than Axis terms.

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There are many fewer Americans than Germans -- one authority puts the number at a mere hundred -- but the British are perhaps more numerous. In addition to official representatives there are some non-official British residents. While their number is not known, it is said that Tangier alone has (or recently had) some 1,700 British residents, whose interests in North Africa seem likely to have been largely commercial.

It is reported that in the French-controlled areas the British residents, official and non-official, have been evacuated from the coast and that British consulates have been closed.

28 August 1942

PART ONE

II. PRINCIPAL SOCIAL GROUPS

B. Moslems

1. Place in the total population

The more than 15,000,000 Moslems of North Africa constitute an overwhelming majority of the total population in each of the four major political divisions, as is shown in the following table.

| Moslem Population of North Africa 1936* | | |
|--|----------------------|--------------------------------|
| Division | Number of Moslems | Percent of Total Population |
| Tunisia | 2,336,000 | 89 |
| Algeria | 6,160,000 | 85 |
| French Morocco | 5,875,000 | 93.5 |
| Spanish Morocco** | 778,000 | 91 |
| North Africa | 15,149,000 | 89 |

Algeria and French Morocco contain four-fifths of the Moslem people (12 million) while Spanish Morocco has fewer than one million. Only in Algeria is the ratio of Moslems to Europeans smaller than nine to one -- and even there 85 percent of the people are Moslem.

* French Annuaire Statistique, 1938. Percents are in close agreement with more recent estimates.

** An additional 40,000 "Moors and Arabs" (a rough estimate) make up between a half and two-thirds of the total population of Tangier. (OSS-RA Mediterranean Section, Situation Report on Tangier, 17 Oct 1941).

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2. Pertinent historical background

When the Moslem Arabs invaded North Africa in the middle of the 7th Century A.D., they found a population which consisted almost entirely of Berbers, the aboriginal people of this area. In some districts, especially in the mountainous parts of Algeria and Morocco, the Berbers resisted the Arabs very strongly. Eventually, however, all of them were converted to Islam. The civilization which developed in North Africa during the Middle Ages and which still persists was a mixture of Arab and Berber elements. Though the Arab population was reinforced by later waves of migration between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries, only a small proportion of the people are of Arabian origin. An "Arab" in North Africa is anyone who speaks Arabic and considers himself a member of the Arab cultural group, whatever his ancestors may have been. The name "Berber" should be reserved for those who have retained the Berber language. Berber culture and speech still predominate in the mountains of Morocco, in the Kabyle and Aures districts of Algeria, and in a few cases.

Most of the Moslems who conquered Spain in the 8th Century and held it for more than seven hundred years were originally Berber. These Spanish Moslems and their North African relatives are sometimes

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called Moors, but this word is too vague to be applied to any modern people. To educated North Africans the name Andalus (Andalusia) still recalls many proud traditions of Moslem Spain.

Early in the Middle Ages the Berbers refused to recognize the successors of Mohammed who were ruling in the East and established a number of independent theocratic states. These were regarded as heretical by other Moslems and their doctrines were finally suppressed, except in a few communities such as the Oasis of Mzab and on the Island of Djerba. One lasting result of this conflict, however, was the growth of religious brotherhoods. In theory these organizations are strongly orthodox, especially in tracing their "chain of authority" back to the Prophet. They have a great deal of influence among the common people.

Except for a few coastal towns which were held by the Spanish and Portuguese, the North African Moslems maintained their independence until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the French and Spanish seized control. The European conquest which began about 1830 was nearly complete at the outbreak of the present war. The Moslem governments of Tunisia and Morocco function under the control of the European conquerors; Algeria is governed as

Initial Period: Oss Spies / Islamic Republic - Islamic State

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a part of France. Most Moslems pay little attention to these large political units. Their relations with each other are determined by traditional loyalties and antagonisms between families, villages, and tribes, by economic conflicts, and by differences in policy with regard to Europeans. Their religion is the only thing that unites them. Nevertheless, such events as the revolt of the Rif Berbers in 1925-26 under the leadership of Abd el Krim show that the Moslems in some parts of North Africa can still give a good account of themselves. In most societies, rich and poor, old and young, they inhabit large households, where their responsibilities, family, and especially to the poor and to religious institutions, and take the lead in public affairs. The members of society often work together amicably and they are not afraid for their children to work in mines, mills and other harsh environments. The author of *A History of North African Islam* and a former Vice-President of Libya says they seem to keep the same names as parents and siblings - names more numerous than in any of the other countries.

Islam is regarded as a great unifying force and as a religion which is the best guarantee against social unrest and which the Moslem can believe in. They also trusted every Moslem, and when you are working or negotiating with them, their

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3. Social Stratification

Social stratification varies considerably in different parts of North Africa and among the different cultural groups. It is least prominent among the mountain Berbers of Algeria and northern Morocco and most prominent in the large Arab towns. Wealth, descent, and occupation all help to determine a man's position in the social scale, but only an intimate acquaintance with a given community will enable an observer to evaluate these factors properly.

No sharp line divides the wealthy from the rest of society. Rich men are respected because they maintain large households, offer their hospitality freely, give generously to the poor and to religious institutions, and take the lead in public affairs. The amount of money which they possess is seldom mentioned, and they are not admired for lavishing their wealth on automobiles and other foreign extravagances. The ascetic ideals of North African Islam and a hatred for Europeans and their ways have helped to keep the rich people of Morocco and Algeria somewhat more conservative than those of the Near East.

Poverty is regarded as a great misfortune but not as a disgrace. Paupers do not form a distinct social class but are merely individuals who live on the fringe of society. They are treated very fairly, and unless they are mentally or physically unfit, they

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often establish themselves as unskilled or semi-skilled laborers.

The great majority of North Africans are neither poor nor rich. They earn a small but sufficient livelihood as farmers, herdsmen, laborers, artisans, and traders. It is impossible to subdivide them on the basis of wealth, since their individual fortunes fluctuate considerably.

Pride of family and a long family tree are more characteristic of the Arabs than of the Berbers, and are better developed among the nomadic tribes than among the people of the towns. Even among the nomadic Arabs, however, it is hard to find any well-defined social classes beneath the hereditary line of chiefs, and chieftainship is subject to the fortunes of war.

The only aristocracy which is strictly hereditary is that of the shurfa, which claims descent from the Prophet Mohammed. A man of this class is called a sharif; a woman, a sherifa. Many families have undoubtedly acquired this title by falsifying their genealogies, but their present right to it is seldom disputed. Though shurfa are not always wealthy or prominent, membership in this class helps a man to become a political or religious leader, and makes a girl more eligible as a bride. Practically all of the ruling families of Morocco have been shurfa.

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Saints (mawbutin) form another hereditary group; but they have no single point of origin like that of the shurfa; and many saintly families cannot trace their lineage back very far. They are less often rich than are the shurfa; and though they are respected by all classes of people, they function more as religious leaders than as governors or rulers.

The Tuareg and other non-Arab tribes of the Sahara are clearly divided into three or four hereditary classes, including nobles, serfs, and slaves; but such rigid lines are rare or absent in communities further north.

Before the European conquest there were many slaves in North Africa. Most of them were Negroes. Their status was only partially hereditary, for they were often freed by their masters, and emancipated slaves were readily assimilated by the rest of the population.

Clean manual labor does not debar the workman from respectable society, though it is avoided by people who do not have to work. Certain occupations, however, are so degrading that those who follow them are social outcasts. Musicians and other professional entertainers form an inferior class, probably because of their association with public dancing-girls. In Berber communities the blacksmiths, the town-cryers, and those who weigh goods in the market have a very low rank.

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These debased professions tend to run in families,
into which no respectable people will marry.

Commerce is the one occupation in which all social
classes meet. A menial laborer may become a merchant
if he can save enough money to buy a small stock of
goods; while it is not beneath the dignity of the
wealthiest sherif to keep a little store in the bazaar,
where he can drink tea and coffee with his business
friends, watch the crowds pass, and bargain over all
kinds of property, from real estate to small pieces
of cloth. The inability or disinclination to organize
corporations -- sometimes explained by Moslems as the
result of distrust in each other, sometimes as that
of personal independence -- has prevented the growth
of a large capitalistic class. condition to allow to
individuals or to small groups of individuals. Some of
these individual firms organize together. These do not

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4. Situations in which attitudes and opinions are formed

a. Situations associated with religion

Important channels of opinion formation for people living in the towns are the mosques and large religious schools. At the mosque on Friday morning most of the men are in a more religious frame of mind than at any other time and are consequently more receptive to rumors and propaganda unfavorable to non-Moslems.

Since non-Moslems are normally excluded, the mosque is the best place for discussions which they should not hear. Before and after the Friday prayers the congregation has ample opportunity to exchange opinions. Rumors are often spread and feelings aroused by the visitors from distant communities who attend the Friday service.

In most mosques religious instruction is given to individuals or to small groups of students. Some of them maintain large organized schools. These schools serve to indoctrinate male Moslems from childhood. The boys attending, or their families, are usually more devout and more fanatical than the general population. Students in the largest and most famous schools often come from other parts of North Africa, thereby introducing new rumors and opinions.

Moslems in North Africa have always tended to form minor sects and religious brotherhoods, many of which have been considered heretical by the Chief Moslem

authorities. Each of these organizations has its center or headquarters -- often the burial place or birthplace of its saintly founder. Here the members of the brotherhood come on pilgrimage or for a course of religious instruction. Agents of the sect travel from tribe to tribe or from town to town, sometimes establishing missionary schools in parts of North Africa very distant from their origin. They are fanatically opposed to non-Moslems, and their ideas are readily accepted by the less educated people.

Opinions and rumors circulate rapidly at the tombs of celebrated saints, especially at the time when festivals are being held there. For the rural population, these tombs are more important than are the large urban mosques.

Also important in formulating opinion are the religious leaders. Moslems have a high respect for religious authority. In orthodox circles this authority is vested in the Ulema, the learned men, who have charge of the largest mosques in the country. Most of the people, however, never see these highest officers. Their legal and religious affairs are administered by the qadi, or Moslem Judge, and the fiqh, or jurist, whose qualifications may be nothing more than the ability to write a few verses from the Koran. Another class of religious leaders, particularly influential

in rural districts, is the maraboutin, the saint. All these religious leaders are leaders of public opinion, and they are invariably conservative and anti-European, maintaining the old traditional attitudes of Islam.

b. Secular situations

Outside the religious institutions the most lively channels of opinion development are markets, cafes, and village councils. Markets are of two kinds: periodical markets, held in country villages, usually once a week, and the permanent market sections of the large towns. Both of these draw hundreds of visitors from the surrounding countryside, who come to exchange their fruit, grain, wool, and livestock for imported and manufactured goods. A day at the market is a social affair. Bargaining is interspersed with long interludes of gossip. The farmer or the herdsman looks to the market as his main source of news from the outside world. The townsman sees little of the country folk except when they come to market. In addition to the exchange of ideas between these two local groups, another stream of rumor and opinion is introduced by the cosmopolitan traders and entertainers who go from one market to another.

The cafe -- or rather the tea-room, since tea is the commoner beverage in North Africa -- is the favorite retreat for men during the quiet hours of the day. The

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Guests are somewhat above average in wealth, social status, and education -- the men who can afford to spend money on entertainment and who know something of the world. Arabs from the nomadic tribes of the Sahara and the steppes spend much of their time in cafes when they come to town. The oasis villages of the south, catering to the nomads, have cafes of their own. The cafe, as a rendezvous and center of discussion, is as important a channel of opinion formation for the upper classes as is the market for the common peasants.

Most communities of sedentary Berbers are governed by democratic village councils. All adult male members of the village attend the council meetings and take part in its deliberations. Berbers returning to their villages from the large towns or from military service with the French bring home the knowledge and attitudes which they have acquired abroad. These may affect the opinions of the entire village.

Three groups of North Africans have had extensive contact with Europeans through travel abroad. The most influential of these are the men who have studied at French universities, chiefly at the University of Paris. They are not numerous, but their acquaintance with the French language and culture, their background of wealth

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discussed by the more radical French students, give them great political importance. The second and third groups comprise the Algerian and Tunisian troops who have served in the French army overseas and the mass of migratory laborers and small traders who have spent some time in France. It is impossible to estimate the effect these last two classes of returned travelers may have on their fellow Moslems in North Africa. Thousands of them are scattered through the country, but most of them are poor and illiterate, and their foreign experiences do not seem to have given them any very great advantage in determining public opinion.

It is difficult to classify the other channels of rumor and opinion. One of the most obvious is the relationship of Moslems with their European employers, particularly that of servants with masters, guides with tourists, and hotel employees with the European guests. These relationships influence the Moslem ideas of the social life and general character of Europeans. The influence is generally unfavorable. Tourist guides can truthfully tell their Moslem friends that their European clients are ignorant suckers who squander their money and can be led around by the nose. Moslems who are in a position to observe Europeans more intimately -- such as servants and hotel employees -- seldom attain any

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b. Religious influences

true understanding of European manners. They have been taught by their religious leaders that Europeans are sacrilegious and sexually promiscuous, and the behavior of young Europeans in North Africa, especially the tourists, does little to correct this view. Servants report all details of their masters' lives to their Moslem friends, often with the most fantastic embellishments and interpretations. The best reports of Europeans are probably given by Moslems who are doing military service under the more competent French officers.

Newspapers are also an important source of opinion for Moslems who can read them. The radio and the film, because of their extremely limited Moslem audience, are probably less influential.

It is the will of Allah. The latter attitude has been adopted by most Moslem Moslems in North Africa and elsewhere over Islamic countries.

God creates the万物. He is the will of "Deekom". Since Allah and Mohammed are all omnipotent, His application to God is something that cannot be in the least questioned. Hence the Moslem's attitude on the fundamental of man. This point would be evidently evident in communication with Moslems.

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5. Religious ideology

Moslems call their religion Islam, "Submission." This signifies the complete subordination of a human being to the Deity. The beliefs and practices of Islam are the following:

There is only one God. No other figure shares his divinity. He is eternal, omniscient, and omnipotent, and His will, identified with fate, determines everything that ever happens. This implies that everyone's fortune is immutably fixed. Though it would obviously be absurd to act consistently in accordance with this doctrine, Moslems often resort to fatalism in times of stress. In warfare they may undertake the most foolhardy adventures, convinced that their conduct can have no effect on their predetermined fate. They may also accept defeat submissively, declaring that it is the will of God. The latter attitude has been adopted by many pious Moslems in North Africa who despise the French regime.

God created the universe, but He is not a "father". Since this word suggests sexual intercourse, its application to God is extremely blasphemous. One of the most monstrous errors of Christianity is its insistence on the fatherhood of God. This topic should be strictly avoided in conversation with Moslems.

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God revealed a system of religion and morality to a long line of prophets. The most prominent of these are Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed. Each successive prophet corroborated but superseded the others. As the "Apostle of God", Mohammed was delegated to revive the religion of Abraham which had been perverted by the Jews. He is the final Prophet, and his revelation, embodied in the Koran, is the final truth. The Koran was dictated to him in the Arabic language by God and the angel Gabriel. Every word in this book is accepted literally and no translation into any other language is authorized. Strangers in Moslem countries should remember that the Koran is the Moslems' most sacred possession.

Moslems do not blame us for following Christ; they blame us for not following him properly. His gospel was corrupted and suppressed by the Christians, but much of it was transmitted by Mohammed in the Koran. Jesus was born of a virgin by divine intervention. He is "of the spirit of God" but not His son. When he had fulfilled his mission, God took him up and provided the Jews with a substitute, whom they crucified thinking it was Jesus. Doctrines on the later functions of Jesus are vague and confused, but it is believed by many Moslems that he will return to earth to kill

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the Antichrist (the "False Messiah") and to reign for forty years, when mankind and all the animal world shall live in complete harmony. After his death he will be buried by the Moslems in a place reserved for him beside Mohammed's own grave.

God is served by an entourage of angels and good demons. He is opposed by the evil demons under the leadership of the arch-fiend Iblis. Moslem angels are very similar to those of Christianity; they act as God's messengers and as the protectors of those whom He favors. Demons frequent old ruins and other places seldom visited by men. They cause insanity, lead people astray in the wilderness, and engage in other malicious pranks.

Human beings are immortal. During their lives on earth they owe a number of duties to God. The first of these is belief: everyone should have perfect faith in the unity and power of God, in the truthfulness of His prophets, and in the resurrection of the dead on the Day of Judgement. This faith should be frequently proclaimed by the recitation of such formulae as "There is no god but God and Mohammed is His Apostle." The Moslem should also perform good works. The most essential of these are prayer, alms-giving, fasting, and pilgrimage. The prayers should be said five times every day: just after sunset, a

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short time after nightfall, at daybreak, at noon, and in the middle of the afternoon. Each year the Moslems should give a certain portion of his wealth to the poor or to some religious institution. He should fast completely (without swallowing anything or letting any foreign substance enter his body) from earliest dawn to sunset during a whole month of the year -- preferably the month of Ramadan. At least once in his life he should perform the rites of pilgrimage at Mecca and Mount Arafat, in western Arabia. An additional obligation, that of war against the infidels, has been emphasized by some Moslem sects. At the Day of Judgement, virtuous people who have believed in God and Mohammed will be admitted to Heaven, where they will enjoy forever the utmost physical and spiritual bliss. The wicked and the unbelievers will be condemned to the torments of Hell.

Moslem conduct is strongly affected by the concept of holiness. Because of their close association with God, certain things are removed from the everyday world and placed in a sacred category. No one can live on friendly terms with the Moslems if he does not show reverence to prayers and other religious performances; to mosques, the tombs of saints, and all buildings and enclosures devoted to religion;

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to the Koran and all other religious books; to the
feasts and festivals of the Moslem year, including
the night of the twenty-seventh of Rassadan; to the
names of God and the Prophets; to saints, both living
and dead, and to all who claim descent from the Prophet
Mohammed. The Arabic words for these sacred persons
and things should be memorized, and all rules pertain-
ing to them should be carefully followed.

The rules which Moslems follow most strictly are
those of ceremonial purity. These are based on the
idea that a person can be defiled, or a religious
object or action violated, by contact with things
which are traditionally unclean. Some of the
commonest sources of pollution are: human excreta,

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area, many local variations have evolved. Some of these are parts of an old pagan heritage which was only partially suppressed by the Moslem missionaries. Others were developed by ignorant, provincial people for whom orthodox Islam was too simple, too impersonal, or too abstract. Still others are the inventions of mystics and reformers. This distinction between orthodox and popular religion is not merely academic; it is recognized and discussed by the Moslem authorities.

Popular beliefs are almost always rationalized in orthodox terms. The need for magical aid and protection is satisfied by incantations which bear the stamp of Islam. Passages from the Koran are magically employed. Protection against the Evil Eye - the malignant power of envy - can be secured by explicitly giving credit to God for anything admired.

Most North African Moslems believe that God has elevated certain people to a spiritual position far above the rest of mankind. These people possess special powers and may best be called saints, though there are several different kinds of saintliness. A saint may be simply the village idiot, to whom the

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however, are the saints who inherit their holiness from their ancestors. An entire tribe ~~may claim~~ saintly descent, though only a few of its members lead an especially holy life. Usually the inheritance-group is much smaller - a family of a few dozen members, or a single man who lives more or less as a hermit at the tomb of his revered ancestor. Wealth and influence are likewise highly variable. Some saints maintain a religious school at the ancestral tomb, drawing a large revenue from students and pilgrims. Others have nothing but a miserable hut. In any case the saint lives near to God. He has the power to bless and may sometimes heal the sick and perform miracles. He is more virtuous than ordinary people and distributes most of his income to the poor. Holiness and personal virtue are very closely associated.

Much educated urban folk, but many more people in pastoral tribesmen know these saints well. Because of this familiarity they are sometimes very disposed to discount miracle-claims. So in the都市和城市中人们常常觉得这些圣人很熟悉，因此常常不重视他们的奇迹。

The last point, however, is very difficult indeed. That most of the urban population is so ignorant

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6. Basic social attitudes

a. General considerations

- (1) Sources. The sources on Moslem attitudes in North Africa are much more comprehensive than those for European attitudes, and probably much more reliable. In general, they show a considerable consistency and uniformity. One caution in assessing this material is necessary. Since it is derived from the judgments of foreign observers, it is not unlikely, that some of the attitudes described are merely repetitions of stereotyped -- and biased -- foreign conceptions of what the native Moslems think.
- (2) Heterogeneity of population. As was pointed out in section 5 above, the Moslem population of North Africa is extremely diverse, containing some highly educated urban folk, but many more nomadic or pastoral tribesmen whose views differ greatly. Because of this heterogeneity there are necessarily many divergences in attitude within the population, and so the generalized attitudes described below must be thought of as representing a preponderance of attitude rather than a universal consensus.
- (3) Ignorance. Observers are in very general agreement that much of the Moslem population is so ignorant

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regarding world affairs as scarcely to be aware that foreign nations other than those with which they have been in immediate contact (i.e. France, Spain, Italy) exist. It is, of course, the more remote populations which are the least aware of the outside world, but even in the cities highly sophisticated Moslems are relatively rare.

One consequence of this ignorance is that Moslem attitudes toward foreigners tend to become generalized, and to be applied to all foreigners or strangers rather than to specific groupings. A further consequence of the lack of sophistication is a genuine inability of most North African Moslems to appreciate or understand the ideological differences which separate the Axis from the United Nations in the present war.

(4) Arab-Berber antagonism. One basic antagonism within the North African population is that between those North Africans who consider themselves Arabs and those who are Berbers. While this distinction is by no means clear-cut from an objective point of view, there is, nevertheless, a real antipathy between these two groups. Historically it has apparently arisen out of the native Berbers' resistance to Arab efforts to substitute Arab for inferior people.

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Berber culture. It has been aggravated by what some observers call a French and Spanish pro-Berber policy. The French colonial administrators especially have utilized this cleavage in the North African population to solidify their own control. They have, for example, used Berber troops to subdue Arab uprisings against their power and have in various other ways encouraged the Berbers as a group in order to reduce the Arab influence.

In general, it is probably accurate to say that the Arab regards the Berber as inferior and less highly civilized, while the Berbers in turn have a hearty dislike for the Arabs.

(5) Attitudes derived from Islam. Two attitudes which are rather pervasively held by North Africans are derived directly from their religious beliefs.

First is the conviction that as Moslems they are superior to other peoples whose religions are different. Somewhat more aggressively than is true of many exclusive religions, Islam insists that its doctrines are the only true approach to God, and that its followers are thus the only true believers.

The converse is the belief that Christians and Jews, or those who profess any other religion, must be, according to the highest religious standards, inferior people.

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A second Islamic precept which most North Africans hold is the belief that "within the democracy of Islam all races are equal."¹ This conviction that racial distinctions do not matter among true believers is put into practice in North Africa, where, despite the presence of a few Negroes and more people with some Negro blood, there is apparently no race prejudice.

(6) Respect for wealth and power. Observers very generally agree that the Moslem population of North Africa is much more influenced by concrete evidence of achievement than by any abstractions. Specifically they are reported time and time again to admire those individuals or nations which they themselves have observed to be powerful or wealthy.

Thus, several reports suggest that Moslem sympathies in the present war are inclined to fluctuate with the fortunes of battle, and to favor currently whichever side seems to be scoring the most impressive victories.

It is further rather generally agreed that the Moslem population is greatly impressed by material things, so that free spenders -- while they may sometimes be regarded as foolish -- are nevertheless

¹A Short Guide to North Africa, Second Edition.

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respected because of their money. The respect
for money means apparently that many of the
North African Moslems can be bribed.

(7) Anti-foreignism. Perhaps the most generally held North African Moslem attitude is a distaste for foreigners. To some extent this arises out of the religious conviction that all but Moslems are inferior, but more directly it is related to the domination of North Africa by European colonial powers. France, Spain, and to a lesser degree Italy -- the nations best known specifically to the Moslems -- are generally disliked, but beyond this Germany, England, and even the United States are regarded with a good deal of suspicion. The North African Moslems for about a century now have felt the European yoke, and with very few exceptions would prefer to be left to themselves and to have foreign domination eliminated.

The strength of this antipathy for foreigners varies from place to place. In Morocco and Tunis, where European control is more recent, it is apparently considerably stronger than in Algeria which the French have occupied for about a century. Several reports indicate that the Algerian Moslems have been rather thoroughly cowed, whereas in Tunisia and Morocco the more remote regions were scarcely under European control at all at the outbreak of the present war.

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b. Attitudes toward the French and France

(1) Underlying antipathy. Throughout Algeria, Tunisia, and French Morocco there is a definite and strong antipathy to the French. This is a particular manifestation of the general Moslem dislike of foreigners and can be accounted for specifically in terms of the French domination of these areas. While it would be a mistake to suppose that all Moslems hate all Frenchmen, the tenor of reports suggests that almost all Moslems dislike or despise the French to varying degrees, some at least, and some of the most. This variation in attitude probably depends upon the past experience of particular segments of the population with the French. In Tunisia, and especially in Morocco, where French occupation is most recent, it is probably considerably stronger than in Algeria, where, as one authority puts it, the natives have been "crushed" by the French. Partly because of more recent occupation and partly because of a different policy which encourages the maintenance of native rulers, Moroccan and Tunisian Moslems seem to retain a much more independent spirit than do the Algerians.

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Even in Algiers, however, it is reported that the Arab masses hate the French, and for various regions of North Africa comments to the effect that the "Moors" hate the French, or that the mainspring of Arab psychology is an anti-French feeling, are frequent.

Only a very few reports indicate any enthusiasm for the French. One of these suggests that some Moslems appreciate the raised living standards which the French administration has achieved, and several others suggest that the native troops at least, and some of the native administrative officials are loyal to the French regime. [See also section (4) below]

(2) The decline of French prestige since 1940.

Several reports suggest that the French have been losing prestige in the eyes of the Moslem population since the fall of France in 1940. It is said that in the Marrakech district, the Pasha, El Glaoui, is rather actively insisting upon his administrative rights and that he has on several occasions come close to defying French authority. That he has succeeded in doing this is also said to have reduced the respect of the native population for the French;

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they see in his behavior an evidence of French weakness.

Another report states that the Arabs of the coast are disgusted with the French because of their complete apathy to their humiliating position and their unwillingness to resist the Germans. Still another asserts that the Moslems feel the French to be weak and inefficient, and even in Algeria it has been reported that the Moslems are becoming arrogant in the face of French weakness.

This reaction is in accord with the general Moslem respect for power and is to have been expected because of the underlying antipathy to the French. It seems to have become more prevalent as time passes.

(3) Specific resentments. The Moslem population is reported by numerous observers to be particularly resentful of food and other shortages, of rationing and of requisitioning. Despite French efforts to ease this feeling by granting the Moslems rather generous treatment in the matter of rationing, it is reported that shortages of sugar, tea, oil, and cotton goods have been marked and have produced grumbling and even overt demonstrations against the French.

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The rationing is apparently most felt by the city populations and the requisitioning by the rural and tribal peoples who produce the meat and other products which French authorities have needed, both for the city populations and for export to France. Reports from the Marra-kech district particularly emphasize resentment of requisitioning.

- (4) Evidences of "loyalty" and "disloyalty." Many reports of native attitudes describe them in terms of loyalty or disloyalty to the French. The consensus seems to be that the general civilian population is "loyal" (i.e., not actively in rebellion), but in a passive and rather sullen way. The striking fact that a Moslem rebellion did not arise in North Africa at the time of France's defeat is perhaps the best evidence of the accuracy of this estimate. Probably it is safe to say that the Moslems in Algeria are less inclined toward active resistance than those in Tunis or Morocco, and that the tribesmen of the mountains and the Hinterland are most openly disgruntled.

Among the native Pashas and Caïds French rule is still accepted, although some of them,

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as was indicated above, are rather vigorously insisting on their rights. Many of these native officials are dependent on the French regime for substantial subsidies, and it may be fair to say that the loyalty of some of them at least is thus "bought" by the French.

Several observers have reported unquestioning loyalty on the part of the native troops. This may be an indirect consequence of the French pro-Berber policy, for many of the native troops are Berbers. In the summer of 1940, not was there apparently no mutiny of native troops, but they are reported to have expressed enthusiastic devotion to the French cause.

(5) Summary estimate. Because the vast majority of the North African Moslem population has been under French control, most North African Moslems may be expected to have specific attitudes toward them. In general, these attitudes are attitudes of resentment and antipathy, but they have not yet become strong enough to produce an outright revolt. There is scattered evidence of an increasing volume of grumbling against the French. Perhaps it is safe to conclude that while the North African Moslems dislike the

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control ended. Their attitudes are not likely to be translated into action at present because of the absence of any acceptable alternatives to toleration of the status quo. The French, at least, are a known quantity, and if the only alternative to them is domination by another foreign power, the North African Moslems have little reason for active rebellion, since it might merely mean a leap "from the frying pan into the fire."

c. Attitudes toward the Spanish. There is little specific evidence on the attitudes of the North African Moslems toward the Spanish. One report states that in French North Africa the Moslems object less to their present masters than they would to Spanish domination. The Sultan of Morocco reportedly was greatly offended by the Spanish handling of his

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In Tangier -- in contradiction to the supposed preference of the French-controlled Moslems for France to Spain -- the Spanish policy toward the Moslems is said to be more liberal than the French.

d. Attitudes toward the Axis

(1) Germany and the Germans. There is more inconsistency in reports on Moslem attitudes toward the Axis (and toward the United Nations) than on their attitudes toward the French. This is quite possibly due in part to the bias of observers. In addition, it seems unlikely that the Moslems, with the exception of a few who may be willing to commit themselves because they hope to gain by picking the winner in advance, will take sides very strongly with any foreign power.

There are some reports that the Arabs of the cities, especially the intellectuals, anticipate that the Germans may win the war and that this may mean the end of foreign domination for Morocco. These people quite probably take a favorable attitude toward the Germans because of their desire for Moroccan independence.

It is reported from several sources that the demonstrated military strength of the Germans

also suggest that the city Moslems may be somewhat pro-German, but they qualify this statement with the assertion that pro-Germanism arises principally as a complement to opposition to the French. The German anti-Semitism, which has been vigorously expressed in propaganda to the Moslems, is said to have aroused some sympathetic responses. One report suggests that a considerable Berber element in Morocco is inclined to be pro-German.

On the other hand, it is reported that many Moslems would prefer a continuing French rule to a possible German domination, that to true believers national socialism is the work of infidels, and that the North African Moslems who have returned from German prison camps are strong anti-German propagandists because of the bad treatment they received. One report asserts

- (1) that the Soussi have been little influenced in Germany's favor despite rather extensive propaganda activities there.
- (2) Italy and the Italians. The few reports examined quite unanimously suggest that Italians are both disliked and despised by North African Moslems. This is reported to be due partly to the poor

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showing the Italians have made in the present war, partly to the poor impression the Sicilian immigrants made on the Moslems when they first

- (2) arrived in Tunisia and Algeria; partly to the rather inept efforts of Mussolini to establish himself as a defender of faith, and partly to the reccency of the Italian conquest of Tunisia. This last event forced a considerable number of refugees from Libya to cross the border into Tunisia, and it is probably here that the antipathy to the Italians is strongest; although one report from Tangier suggests that Moslems there also dislike the Italians.

The above remarks must be thought of as applying only to those North African Moslems who actually possess attitudes toward the Italians - many of them probably have no reaction, positive or negative, beyond their general dislike of Europeans. (2), feelings toward the British are

- (3) The Japanese. Few North African Moslems have any pronounced attitudes toward the Japanese. The better educated Arabs of the cities, who are aware of international events, quite probably respect the military successes achieved by the Japanese; and it is possible, as one document suggests, that certain parallels between Japanese
and American of this country.

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and Moslem ideals may afford the basis for a considerable sympathy for Japan among this limited class.

e. Attitudes toward the United Nations

(1) England. English military weakness as opposed to German strength is said to have reduced Moslem respect for Great Britain. Some observers feel that British prestige in North Africa fluctuates with the tide of battle rather regularly. In general, the impression gained from scattered reports is that England's rather dubious record in dealing with Middle Eastern Moslem countries may have produced some mild anti-British sentiment. Other reports suggest that the natives of the Marrakech district are inclined to be pro-English, and that there is an appreciation of England as a potential source of goods which no longer arrive under French auspices.

In general, feelings toward the British seem not to be strongly positive or negative.

(2) The United States. Attitudes toward the United States are likely to be absent, lukewarm, or ambivalent. Apparently only the educated classes in the towns have any clear views on the United States, while the uneducated town masses and the peasants and nomads of the hinterland are scarcely conscious of this country.

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Among those Moslems who do have opinions of the United States some are inclined to be rather mildly favorable because of the good American record in dealing with the Near East; because of their respect for American wealth and power, because of the good impression which has been made by American industrial products, and because of their conviction that of all the great powers only the United States can be counted upon to take a genuinely disinterested attitude toward North Africa. Some reports indicate very strong Moslem support for the United States. In one, for example, it is said that four-fifths of the Moroccans now favor this country. On the whole, however, it would seem that such a statement is overenthusiastic and that most North African Moslems are at the present time more or less indifferent to the United States. Possibly offsetting the favorable impression of some educated city Moslems is a resentment of American support for Zionism.

f. Attitudes toward the Moslem world. Available evidence indicates that there is little pan-Islamic sentiment among North African Moslems, although there may be some pan-Arab enthusiasm. The general impression gained from scattered evidence is that while many

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of the better educated North African Moslems are in a sense nationalist, their nationalism is a local North African affair. They are said to be more concerned with local problems -- and in terms of nationalism this means eliminating European control -- than with any pan-Islamic or pan-Arab movement. Even this putative local nationalism is apparently not powerfully organized and seems to lack effective leadership, possibly because of age-old rivalries and antagonisms between various segments of the Moslem population. While educated Moslems are reported to take considerable interest in the affairs of the Moslem nations of the Middle East, events there seem not to concern them as vitally as might be supposed. Turkey is reported to be of considerable influence through Radio Ankara, in which the Moslems are said to have more confidence than in the transmissions of either the United Nations or Axis powers.

5. Attitudes toward the Jews. Reports vary as to the strength of anti-Semitism among the North African Moslems, although they rather generally agree that the Moslem population is anti-Semitic. One authority emphasizes the fact that Moslem dislike of Jews is a religious rather than a racial attitude and therefore qualitatively quite different from German

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anti-Semitism. Other evidences suggest that so far as North Africa is concerned, the Moslems and the native Jews have worked out a modus vivendi which enables them to live together in a way more or less satisfactory to both groups, and that the Moslems are not so much against Jews as Jews as they are against Zionism. Other reports, however, suggest that the Moslem population has been quite pleased by the application of Vichy anti-Semitic laws in French North Africa, and that German propaganda has had some success because of its appeal to Arab anti-Semitism.

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TABULAR SUMMARY

| | <u>French</u> | <u>Spanish</u> | <u>Italian</u> |
|--|--|--|---|
| a. Approximate Numbers | 1-1½ million: 3/4 in Algeria; largely urban. | ½ million, mostly in Morocco and Algeria. | 1/8 million, in Morocco and Algeria. |
| b. Origin in North Africa | Entered as entrepreneurs, colonists, administrators, soldiers following establishment of French political control in 19th and 20th centuries. | Entered as soldiers, temporary or permanent settlers (in cities and on land), and as refugees. | Emigrants from Sicily and South Italy: in latter part 19th century workers, fishermen, agriculturalists, a few merchants, industrialists. |
| c. Important Sub-Groups | <u>Urban:</u> civil officials, merchants, industrialists and petty bourgeoisie, a small proletariat (in Algeria). <u>Rural:</u> agricultural officers and men, settlers, especially bureaucrats, in Algeria. <u>Other:</u> the military. | The majority are city folk. Important groupings are civilian settlers, political refugees, army officers and men, bureaucrats, Falangists. | 1) Workers and employees; some employers. 2) Teachers, propagandists, consular officials. 3) Armistice Commission. |
| d. Situations in Which Attitudes and Opinion Are Formed | In family and other intimate groups, through private and public discussion (the latter limited, through patriotic festivals and through the press (limited). | Informal association and discussion, the Church, Falangist meetings. | 1) Italian schools 2) Italian societies and clubs; social welfare organizations 3) 1935-1939, Fascist groups; "Dopolavoro" (after work organization Balilla. 4) Family and intimate social groups. 5) Possibly church influences. |

PR

NCIA: SOCIAL GROUPS

Germans

British & Americans

Moslems

Jews

Not over a few thousand, mostly in cities.

A few thousand British, 100 Americans, mostly in cities.

16-17 million, mostly rural or nomadic.

1-1 million, mostly in cities.

y; Present a Nazi
agents.

and,

Present as British or American agents, some English came for commercial reasons.

Berbers are age-old migrants in residents; "Arabs" are the descendants of the Arabicized Berbers of the Middle Ages

Phoenician days and in 7th, 8th, 9th centuries from the East; migrants from Spain following the expulsion, later migrants from Europe, and recent refugees from Europe.

Consular Officials, Consular and other Armistice Commission representatives, secret agents. non-official residents.

Berbers are linguistically distinct from Arabs, and are usually peasants or nomads rather than urbanites. Arabs constitute the bulk of the Moslem city population but are also peasants and nomads. Both groups are scattered across North Africa from Morocco to Tunisia.

The most important distinction is between old North African Jews who live a ghetto life, and those whose way of life is European. Virtually all are city folk -- merchants, artisans, professionals.

In gatherings at mosques, religious schools, saints' tombs; at markets, cafes and village councils; through the influence of Moslems -- students or servants -- who have had contacts with Europeans.

For European Jews, situations follow the European pattern; for ghetto Jews, the family, the synagogue, religious schools, the leadership of the community are presumably of first importance.

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e. and Religion

French

Ideologies:
colonial-imperial,
reactionary-
traditional,
liberal-democratic
(suppressed).
Religion: Catholic.

Spanish

Imperialist-ex-
pansion dominant;
Falangist,
monarchist.
Religion: Catholic.

Italian

Majority essentially
Fascist, very
probably; some even
members of Fascist
Party. A very
small nucleus with
socialistic and
democratic ideals.
Religion: Catholic.

f.
Basic Social
Attitudes

- 1) Strong French patriotism, usually identifying Vichy and France.
- 2) Some North African localism.
- 3) Prevailing coolness toward the "Fighting French."
- 4) General antipathy to Germany, with some support for collaboration and some strong opposition to it.
- 5) Antipathy to Italy, especially in Tunisia.
- 6) Some distrust of Spanish intentions.
- 7) Preponderant antipathy to England.
- 8) Prevailing (mild) pro-U.S. feeling.
- 9) Prevailing anti-Russian, anti-Communist sentiments.
- 10) Considerable distrust and fear of Moslems, who are "colonial peoples" to the French.
- 11) Moderate to strong anti-Semitism.

- 1) Probable envy of French colonial success.
- 2) Probable slight favoring of Germany in effort to walk the tight rope of neutrality.
- 3) Probable support for Franco regime, ranging from enthusiasm to passive thankfulness that Spain is still not a belligerent.
- 4) Probable strong antipathy to Russia.
- 5) Probable relative indifference to Britain and the U.S.
- 6) Probable strong anti-Semitism.

- 1) Majority conscious of the inferiority of their position and look up to Fascist government's efforts.
- 2) Probably not cordial to Frenchmen who are favored in every way by the government.
- 3) Anti-Russian.
- 4) Probably ignorant of and sympathetic to democratic ideas and ideals.
- 5) Very probably not enthusiastic about Germans.
- 6) None in Greece.

Spanish
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sion dominant;
angist.
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ition: Catholic.

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French colonial
cess.
Probable slight
woring of Germany
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Probable support
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democratic ideals and
sympathy to Russia.
Probable relative
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itain and the U.S. about Germans.
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Majority essentially
Fascist, very
probably; some even
members of Fascist
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inferiority of
their position and
look up to Fascist
government's efforts.
2) Probably not
cordial to French
who are favored in
every way by the
government.
3) Anti-Russian.
4) Probably
ignorant of or not
sympathetic to
democratic ideals and
sympathy to Russia.

5) Very probably
not enthusiastic

Germans

Pro-German, etc.

British & Americans

British or American
version of United
Nations.

Moslems

Religious ideology
is Islamic —
orthodox among city
Arabs, but with
variations derived
from old folk
beliefs among some
tribesmen —
especially the
Berbers.

Jews

Ideologies are
probably quite
varied among the
European Jews;
among ghetto Jews,
they probably are
more uniform and
follow the pattern
of old world
orthodox Judaism.

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1) Undoubted anti-
Germanism.
2) Probable
suspicion and
distrust — if not
dislike — of the
French.
3) Profound respect
for wealth and power.
4) Strong, wide-
spread dislike of
foreigners.
5) Prevailing
Moslem antipathy
to the French.
6) Antipathy to the
Spanish.
7) Some respect for
German power and
some hope that a
German victory may
mean the end of
foreign domination:
little marked
enthusiasm for
Germany.

8) Italians tend to
be disliked and
despised.
9) Probable mild
dislike of English
in some groups.
10) Probably greater
respect and tolerance
for the United States
than for any other
major power (except
possibly Germany)
among the very few
educated Moslems who
leave a clear
conception of the
United States.
11) Little pan-Islamic
sympathy: some North
African patriotism among
urban populations.
12) A rather general, but
non-racial, anti-Semitism.

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PART TWO

IV. AXIS PROPAGANDA

D. German and Italian propaganda lines.

4. Appeals to the self-interest of the audience

The Axis is making extensive use of exiled anti-British and anti-Jewish Arab leaders from the British controlled Moslem lands of the Near East. The intensive propaganda campaign in which those leaders are an important part is focused on the Near Eastern lands and Egypt, but much of the same propaganda is used by the Axis in North Africa -- where it may have unwanted repercussions, as well as positive effects, for the Axis cause. The two exiles who figure most prominently in the Axis propaganda today were at one time persons of genuine influence in the Near East. A number of others of lesser status, resident in Germany, Italy, and Greece, are also cooperating with the Axis propagandists.

a. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al Husseini. Prior to his inheriting the position of Mufti of Jerusalem in 1921, Haj Amin had been an officer in the Ottoman army and had been imprisoned by the British for political activities. Using his position of Mufti as a political rather than a religious position, he rapidly became a major influence in Palestine and the Arab world. For a number of years he was president of the Supreme Islamic Council. Through his control over the distribution of Moslem charity and his ability to appoint many minor officials, he became a minor Moslem pope and the most powerful Arab leader in Jerusalem. He was largely responsible for the Jewish-Arab civil war in Palestine. Through such activities he came again into conflict with the British and was eventually forced into exile.

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Since January 20, 1942, he has been residing in Italy and Germany. He is apparently slated to be the major Arab puppet if any Axis controlled Arab government is established. There are strong indications that he was receiving Italian money long before he left Palestine.

b. Rashid Ali al Gailani, ex-Premier of Iraq. Rashid Ali was the leader of the attempted Iraq Putsch against the British rule in May, 1941. He comes from one of the oldest and best-known families of Iraq, although he is not necessarily representative of their political position. He was in politics under the Ottoman Empire and has remained active in this field since that time. He first entered the Iraq cabinet in 1924. In 1933 he became Prime Minister, which position he held from time to time until last year. Following the abortive revolt, he fled to Turkey and later to Axis Europe. He has been sentenced to death by an Iraqi military tribunal because of his leadership of the rebellion. German activities have been credited with playing a large role in this revolt. Rashid Ali receives attention in Axis propaganda equal, or only slightly second, to that of the Grand Mufti.

c. Other Arab Exiles. Most prominent among these is Emir Shukid Arslan, condemned to death by France for activity in Syria during the early years of the French mandate, since then operating from Geneva propagandizing for Arab independence, and more recently propagandizing in the employ of Germany. Three other members of the Iraqi revolt are in Europe: Haji Shawkat, former Minister of Defense; Mohammed Hasan Salim, former Minister of Education; and Sherif Sharai, a minor royalty who was to be set up as puppet regent. Ramil Gailani, younger brother of Rashid Ali, is also in Germany. It is reported that Musa Husseini, nephew of the Grand Mufti, is in Athens working for German propaganda there. Minor figures politically, but able propagandists, are Yunis Buri, a very popular Iraqi intellectual broadcasting for Berlin (unverified reports describe him as off the air since June of this year); Butrus Musayar, a Syrian Maronite priest broadcasting from Rome encouraging Syrian Christians to join with their Moslem brothers in throwing off British rule; and a Sheikh Abdul Kader Al Khazini, who also broadcasts for Italy. The Italians also have an "Egyptian Society", the activity and pronouncements of which they are able to publicize. This society is headed by Dr. Mahmud Nasr.

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In these figures, the Axis has perhaps the cream of the anti-British and anti-Jewish Moslem leaders who have arisen in the Near East in recent years.

Prior to May, the Axis seemed to be holding the Grand Mufti and Rashid Ali somewhat in reserve for a major propaganda blow, for although there were ample reports of their activities and their interviews, they themselves did not speak in person on the radio. However, on the second anniversary of Rashid Ali's revolt both leaders spoke for the benefit of the Arab world, carrying the usual Axis message of hate for Britain, Zionism, and Communism, and vague assurances of Axis goodwill and sympathy for Arab nationalist aspirations.

On the occasion of the much publicized Axis declaration of freedom for Egypt, an elaborate statement by the Grand Mufti was read. A few days later a similar statement came from Rashid Ali. Such statements are the best Axis means of convincing the Arab world of the supposed disinterestedness of the Axis with regard to the Moslem world.

There are limitations, however, on the extent to which the figures of these Arab leaders can be exploited. Early in the Spring competent British observers expected that the first radio appearance of these two men would herald the establishment of an Arab government in exile. These anticipations have not as yet been fulfilled. Moreover, the character of Axis commitments remained far too vague to be completely

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satisfactory propaganda. Behind all this apparently lies an inability of the Mufti and Rashid Ali to secure the desired concessions from the Axis, or perhaps to agree among themselves. It also is highly probable that an Axis puppet government involving the men now in Europe would be unacceptable to all parts of the Moslem world except Iraq, Jerusalem, and possibly Syria.

For North Africa the weakness of Axis propaganda involving these exiled leaders is even clearer. The Moroccans are apparently more interested in an independent and unified Morocco than in an all-inclusive Arab state. Moreover they, like every Moslem group of any size, fancy only themselves as the leaders of Pan-Arabia. Germany has so far failed to specify freedom for North African Moslems, probably for fear of alienating French and Spanish publics. This fact has engendered criticism even in the strongly pro-German Moroccan-Arabic paper Al Hurriya. This limitation, of course, applies to open or official Axis propaganda. There are many indications that in her subversive propaganda Germany is fully exploiting Moroccan resentment against France.

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PART TWO

VIII. BRITISH PROPAGANDA

C. Propaganda Lines

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3. British Broadcasts in Moroccan

The BBC program in Moroccan regularly consists of news interspersed with music, followed by a feature program, which changes from day to day in some sort of weekly rotation. The music used is usually Moroccan but frequently Andalusian, Algerian, or Tunisian. The Moroccan transmission differs little from the Arabic as far as the news program is concerned. Most of the news is about the war, presented from a strongly pro-Allied point of view. News from British-controlled Arabic lands consists mainly of quotations from the Arabic press, stressing Axis villainy, Arabic solidarity with the British, British deliveries of food, and the like.

German atrocities play a particularly large role in the Moroccan transmissions. In the early weeks of August there was a strong emphasis upon the German use of Moroccans in experiments with poisonous gases. This theme had the dual purpose of increasing Moroccan hatred and fear of Germany, and preventing Moroccans from signing up to go to Europe as workers. The theme was even dramatized on one occasion in a playlet showing a scene in the German experimental

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laboratories. A regular ending of the news broadcasts during this campaign repeated the appeal in explicit form. A typical one from the August 1 broadcast follows:

"Noble listener, remember! Remember that the Germans despise you and call you the lowest race of mankind. Remember that the Germans hate you, but want your goods. Remember that the Germans are trying to trap you into becoming slaves in their factories. Remember that if you go; the Germans will use you to try out their new gases. Remember the Moroccan martyrs of Augsburg of whom you heard last night."

There is almost no mention of events within North Africa. Exceptions to this are programs stressing the Allied exports of cotton, sugar, and tea to North Africa, and regrets expressed upon the occasion of the death of the Bey of Tunis. There is no discussion of the political future of North Africa. However, it is emphasized in a general sort of way that the smaller countries of the world will fare best with a United Nations victory. The four freedoms and the German oppression of Europe are likewise stressed.